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Notes from the Editor 
 
The overarching theme of this issue of Homeland Security Affairs is response – 
to public health emergencies, natural and man-made disasters, threats of nuclear 
attack, and the messages of terrorists. 
  
One essay and one short-form article offer suggestions for improving response to 
public health emergencies. Christine Bradshaw and Thomas Bartenfeld contend 
that the ultimate test of our proficiency in responding to disasters is how 
responders and systems operate in actual disasters, which (fortunately) happen 
rarely. In lieu of the real thing, emergency responders must rely on exercises to 
perfect response skills. However, few standardized instruments exist to guide the 
process of exercise evaluation. To address this shortage, Bradshaw and 
Bartenfeld have developed “Exercise Evaluation Guides for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness” in the areas of epidemiologic surveillance and 
investigation and isolation and quarantine.  
 
Also addressing the issue of public health response is Valerie Yeager’s 
“Emergency Response, Public Health, and Poison Control: Logical Linkages for 
Successful Risk Communication and Improved Disaster and Mass Incident 
Response,” the winning entry of the 2009 CHDS Essay Contest.  All-hazards 
response planning is, Ms. Yeager argues, too often conducted in the silos of 
individual agencies and organizations. She suggests bridging these silos through 
collaboration between public health and poison control, utilizing the existing 
poison control network as an efficient means of providing public health 
information to the public during emergencies. This would have multiple benefits: 
mitigating public anxiety, preventing avoidable surges in demand for medical 
services, ensuring greater consistency and continuity in response operations, and 
providing much-needed financial stability to the poison control system. 
 
The three research articles published in this issue also look at response – to 
disasters, the threat of nuclear attack, and the messages of terrorists.  
 
Disaster relief often rests on the assumption that first responders will report for 
assignment. Research has found family preparedness and safety are determinants 
in the decision of responders to report. “Beyond the Plan: Individual Responder 
and Family Preparedness in the Resilient Organization,” by Mark Landahl and 
Cynthia Cox, presents the results of a survey of homeland security professionals 
and analyzes gaps in national preparedness guidance and individual agency 
planning and training for responder family preparedness. The authors explore 
possible solutions at three levels of organizational responsibility for responder 
and family preparedness and suggest directions for future research that will assist 
in developing best practices to improve responder ability and willingness to 
report for assignment, an essential element in developing realistic response 
plans. 
 
Legislation and response plans are often based on predictions of nuclear weapons 
effects, many of which appear to derive from “Cold War” military effects analyses.  
In “Inaccurate Predictions of Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse 
Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness” Robert Harney argues that these 
analyses dramatically overestimate the damage a terrorist nuclear weapon is 
likely to produce in a metropolitan area. The models presented in this article 
suggest that planning for terrorist attacks and other government actions may be 
based on seriously erroneous assumptions and should be revisited. Given 
Harney’s scenarios, consequence management in the event of nuclear attack is 
not only essential but practicably achievable. 
 
Like nuclear weapons effects, the effect of terrorist messages may also be 
overestimated. John Tures poses the question, “Do Terrorists Win Elections?” 
This myth, he argues, is largely based on results at the ballot box in Spain and 
America in 2004. Most Spanish voters had made up their minds long before the 
Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004. For those undecided prior to Election 
Day the government’s decision to blame the wrong group may have affected their 
votes more than the terrorist attack itself. In the case of the 2004 U.S. 
presidential race, many in the media attributed the reelection of George W. Bush 
to the bin Laden videotape released in October of that year. Yet multiple polls 
showed John Kerry narrowing the gap in the final days before the election. 
Through detailed analysis of poll results, this article reveals problems with the 
argument that democracies and election outcomes can be manipulated by 
terrorists. 
 
We hope you find this issue of Homeland Security Affairs informative and 
thought-provoking. As always, we welcome your contribution to the ongoing 




Exercise Evaluation Guides for 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
Christine C. Bradshaw and Thomas A. Bartenfeld 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate test of proficiency for emergency responders and the systems in which they 
operate is an actual disaster. Fortunately, disasters happen rarely, so responders must 
find alternate ways to practice their skills. The best forms of practice are exercises and 
drills that simulate reality as closely as practicable.1 “The true value of exercises lies in 
the opportunities they offer to practice skills and make mistakes in a low-cost, low-risk, 
low-consequence environment compared with real catastrophes.”2 To fully realize this 
value, the ability of individuals to perform their jobs and to coordinate their efforts 
during an exercise must be evaluated. Though evaluation is essential, standardized 
instruments to assess how well responders perform during an exercise are relatively 
new.   
The purpose of this article is to provide standardized instruments called Exercise 
Evaluation Guides (EEGs) for two public health functions: Epidemiologic Surveillance 
and Investigation and Isolation and Quarantine. These EEGs are intended to aid 
judgment (1) of public health responder performance using the guides’ check-lists and 
(2) of emergency response plans using the guides’ planning sections. In addition to 
providing guidance for evaluators regarding actions they should expect to observe from 
responders, the EEGs present (1) performance measures that measure quality, as 
opposed to more commonly available measures of timeliness, or percent of effort 
completed and (2) planning elements to evaluate adequacy of response plans.   
The guides are particularly useful for evaluation because they rely on observations 
made by an independent third party, as opposed to assessment made by self-report. 
Evaluation done by an independent third party, who is neither playing in the exercise 
nor conducting it, is preferred to self-reported assessment because the former likely 
yields less biased, more credible performance data.  
The initial sections of this article offer background information about EEGs, describe 
the methods used to create them, explain their component elements, and discuss their 
intended use. The EEGs, performance measures, and relevant planning elements are 
then provided as appendices: (1) Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation 
(hereafter called Epi), Appendix A; and (2) Isolation and Quarantine, Appendix B.  
BACKGROUND  
The public health EEGs presented here are based on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) concept of capabilities. The DHS provides a definition of capabilities in 
operational terms: Responders become capable of performing critical tasks to expected 
levels of proficiency through adequate planning, equipping, training, organizing, and 
exercising that includes evaluation and corrective action. Capabilities-based planning 
has been used by the military to plan for flexible configuration and deployment of 
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resources under conditions of great uncertainty. The main question for each capability 
is: If you can help manage an incident, what are you capable of doing? DHS defines 
thirty-seven capabilities in its current version of the Target Capabilities List (September 
2007).3 Two public health capabilities from the list are addressed in this article: (1) 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation and (2) Isolation and Quarantine. Thus, 
the related public health EEGs are named accordingly.    
These public health EEGs are also consistent with the DHS Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). According to DHS, HSEEP is a “capabilities 
and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology 
and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and 
improvement planning.”4 The Exercise Evaluation Guides offered by DHS are also called 
EEGs. The public health EEGs derive their name from the DHS EEGs. Both the DHS 
EEGs and the public health EEGs presented in this article aid the process of evaluation. 
HOW THESE PUBLIC HEALTH EEGS DIFFER FROM THE DHS EEGS 
The Planning Section 
Each of the two public health EEGs presented in this article has a section to help with 
planning, a requirement for exemplary performance during real or mock disasters. 
Ideally, emergency planners anticipate the needs of responders by examining lessons 
learned from past events, projecting how a response might unfold, inventorying 
available resources, and projecting resource shortfalls. Industry “best practices” are 
often well represented in effective plans. However, the process of planning is frequently 
cited as being more valuable than having a written plan. Planning promotes responder 
collaboration, whereas plans do not necessarily assure it. Such conventional wisdom 
notwithstanding, by using the planning checklists evaluators can detect strengths and 
potential vulnerabilities in preparedness. Evaluators can conduct a pre-exercise 
document review to help determine whether planning is adequate. If a jurisdiction has 
paid careful attention to planning, it typically has written evidence to substantiate its 
efforts. Also, if player performance does not meet expectations, evaluators can consider 
planning deficiencies when analyzing the reasons why performance is not as expected. 
For example, in the Isolation and Quarantine EEG, Appendix B1: Planning, if a 
jurisdiction’s planners diligently identified alternate quarantine facilities before a 
pandemic, they will likely have current memoranda of agreement in place with those 
facilities to expedite transfer of legal authority to use the facility in an emergency.  
Performance Measures based on Quality 
Exercise evaluators must be able to determine whether players’ actions and decisions 
are (1) appropriate (the right action), (2) timely (done at the right time), and (3) of 
acceptable quality (done the right way) to achieve the intended outcomes. This article 
suggests measures of performance based on quality, namely quality decision-making 
and quality work products. The performance measures in the DHS EEGs tend to 
emphasize evaluation based on timeliness and occasionally on percent of effort 
completed.    
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SIMILARITIES TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND 
EVALUATION PROGRAM (HSEEP) AND THE DHS EEGS 
Like the DHS EEGs, the public health EEGs are modular. Modularity allows exercise 
designers to combine different activities and critical tasks from within and between 
instruments in a “mix and match” fashion to create an evaluation specific for the 
exercise being developed. DHS describes the process at their HSEEP website, which 
links to a tool called the EEG Builder.5 The DHS tool enables emergency planners to 
“build an EEG” by selecting activities and tasks pertinent to the exercise they want to 
conduct in order to test the objectives they set forth in the exercise. These public health 
EEGs are created with the same process in mind. For example, if the objectives of an 
exercise are to (1) test the protocols for public health officials to assess an ill passenger 
arriving from a foreign country that is experiencing an outbreak of human cases of novel 
influenza and (2) determine whether isolation or quarantine are needed for the 
passengers and crew, the exercise designers might want to select and combine relevant 
activities and critical tasks from both public health evaluation instruments: 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation and Isolation and Quarantine. In contrast, 
the activity in the Epi EEG entitled “Human Health Threat Analysis for Exposures to 
Toxins” is not pertinent to a scenario that depicts a known contagious disease. Thus, this 
latter activity would likely not be incorporated into the given exercise.   
METHODS  
Creating EEGs requires three types of expertise: (1) subject matter, (2) exercise 
development and design, and (3) evaluation.  
Subject Matter Expertise 
In creating these public health EEGs we acquired the first type of expertise initially from 
small groups of five to ten subject matter experts at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). This cadre of experts described the major categories of activity and 
related critical tasks that comprise their jobs. The categories and associated tasks 
became the major elements of the EEG detailed in the Results section. Their discussion 
was based on the fifteen DHS National Planning Scenarios,6 which cover an array of 
natural and man-made disasters (e.g., an outbreak of pulmonary anthrax or a pandemic 
of influenza). 
Next, this work was vetted with larger groups of ten to twenty state and local subject 
matter experts, including representative members from the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, and the International 
Society for Disease Surveillance. The expertise of these public health professionals was 
obtained at nationally convened meetings and by requests for commentary through 
their professional associations. Face-to-face meetings were followed by phone and email 
consultation to ensure that the instruments accurately captured in words what the 
experts think and do in practice. In addition, we searched the published literature to get 
even more detail and to assure that the evaluation instruments are consistent with how 
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experts have handled real incidents in their particular disciplines. The expert subject 
matter content in the EEGs is the result of all the above consultations and deliberations. 
Our goal was to strike a balance between having enough accurate content without 
having too much unnecessary content. Inaccurate content or omissions of critical steps 
can lead to poor performance and misunderstanding of public health’s role, but too 
much unnecessary content prevents the instruments from being practical.  
Exercise Development and Design and Evaluation 
We acquired the second type of expertise, exercise development and design, from CDC 
staff who are DHS-certified Master Exercise Practitioners. We obtained the third type of 
expertise, evaluation, from CDC experts in evaluation practice. Collectively, these 
individuals helped transform the subject matter expert content into action steps that can 
be observed and evaluated during an exercise.  
RESULTS  
The Elements of an EEG  
The public health EEGs are organized like the DHS EEGs, namely Capability 
Description, Capability Outcome, Activities, Critical Tasks, and Observation Keys.7 
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Figure 2. Narrative example of hierarchy depicted in Figure 1. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF EEG ELEMENTS 
Capability Description  
The capability description is a broad overview of the resources (i.e., personnel, 
equipment, supplies) that contribute to management of a given emergency. It is what 
the capability offers to the disaster.  
Capability Outcome 
The capability outcome is the anticipated result of the collective effort provided by the 
Capability.   
Activities 
Activities are category headings for critical tasks that share a similar purpose. For 
example, an overall capability might include the public health activities of surveillance, 
case investigation, and mitigation and containment. Activities are subdivided into 
critical tasks. 
Mission: Manage the Outbreak 
 
Capability: Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation (Appendix A) 
 
Activity 2: Case investigation to confirm the outbreak 
 
Activity Description: Determining to whom the event is occurring, what is the nature of 
the event, and when and where it is occurring (i.e., the who, what, when, where, and how). 
 
Performance Measure: Health Alert Network messages must be of minimally 
acceptable quality (applies also to health alerts generated by jurisdictions that have 
the same intent and purpose as official Health Alert Network alerts). For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Work Product Criteria.  
 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Confirm the existence of an unusual occurrence or event 
! Case report data interpreted to determine meaning and implications; epidemiologic 
clues evaluated 
! Syndromic surveillance data analyzed using aberration detection (if available and 
appropriate for use in given situation)  
! Alternate explanations considered (e.g., increased clinician awareness as a result of 
recent media attention to certain diseases, new physicians or clinics in the vicinity, 
changes in diagnostic methods. 








Performance Measures (Epi EEG only) 
Performance can be measured in terms such as time (e.g., the ambulance arrived within 
ten minutes of dispatch), accuracy (e.g., the triage nurse accurately categorized the 
patient’s level of care required as “immediate” because the patient had life-threatening 
injuries), and quality (e.g., the attending physician administered the correct treatment). 
The Epi EEG suggests some performance measures which might serve as standards for 
evaluating the quality of decisions and work products.  
Critical Tasks 
Critical tasks, indicated with a checkbox ( ), describe steps that are deemed critical 
and, therefore, must be done to achieve the expected outcome of the Activity and, 
ultimately, the capability. Critical tasks are usually performed in sequence, in the 
preferred order typically followed by subject matter experts.  
Observation Keys 
Observation keys, indicated with a checkmark (!), are subdivisions of each critical task, 
intended to help evaluators identify whether responders have met important indicators 
for each critical task. They do not cover every action to be taken by responders; rather, 
they provide supplemental information as needed to enhance the usefulness of the 
instrument. 
HOW THE TWO PUBLIC HEALTH EEGS DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation  
Only the Epi EEG includes some suggested performance measures, which may be used 
to judge the quality of responder performance. These performance measures offer 
criteria for determining the quality of certain decisions made and work products 
generated in the course of executing this capability. Quality is important because 
responders in other capabilities rely heavily on the decisions and work products handed 
off to them from the Epi capability. To conduct their own work, they need these 
products to be of acceptable quality. Disaster management literature repeatedly cites the 
hand-offs, or interfaces, between capabilities, as exceptionally prone to failure if the 
work that links them is inadequate or missing.8 When decision making is faulty, work 
products are of poor quality, or work products do not get handed off to the correct, 
linked capability the emergency response system becomes disorganized.  
Because these performance measure criteria are complex with multiple variables to 
consider for a single decision, we included the criteria as an appendix to avoid 
repeatedly diverting the reader’s attention from the flow of logic and sequence of critical 
tasks in the body text. The performance measure is described under its related activity, 
and the associated criteria are located in Appendix A2: Criteria for Performance. 
Isolation and Quarantine  
In contrast to the Epi EEG, the Isolation and Quarantine EEG embeds decision-making 
criteria in the body text. The decisions presented in this instrument frequently have only 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
7 
two variables [e.g., Patient needs hospital-level care (yes/no)]. Including simple criteria 
in the body text does not disrupt logic and sequence.  
Though the decision-making criteria are simple, the Isolation and Quarantine EEG 
contains many decisions. For example, when a public health professional is determining 
whether a patient’s home, or alternate facility, is a suitable site for isolation or 
quarantine, that professional must determine whether the site has basic necessities such 
as utilities, ventilation, showers, and food preparation areas. If essential needs cannot 
be met, the public health responder assessing the suitability of the site should judge the 
site unacceptable. The evaluator can ask the public health official to “think out loud” and 
voice the criteria he is considering when determining site suitability. The evaluator can 
then use the criteria as a guide to ascertain whether the official is considering those 
criteria that experts expect to be considered.  
DISCUSSION 
How to Use the Public Health EEGs 
The public health EEGs are primarily for use in operations-based (e.g., functional, full-
scale) exercises, but they can guide the evaluation of discussion-based (e.g., tabletop) 
exercises as well. These exercise types are more fully explained in the DHS, HSEEP 
Policy and Guidance; Volume I, HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program 
Management.9 The public health EEGs can also be used to de-brief following routine 
disease outbreak investigations (i.e., routine after-action reviews) to assess the quality of 
decisions made and actions taken during the investigations. The EEGs are intended for 
use as part of a comprehensive program to assess preparedness. Evaluations of 
preparedness depend on other factors such as quality of exercise design, 
appropriateness of exercise scope, and assumptions made by planners (e.g., use of 
volunteers to distribute assets from the Strategic National Stockpile assumes that the 
volunteers will show up). 
Not all elements of an EEG apply to every scenario or to every phase of a scenario. 
Subject matter experts are needed to create EEGs and their knowledge and judgment 
are equally needed to ensure correct application of the content. Their expertise is 
essential to all phases of exercise development. Experts should help to set the objectives 
for the exercise, define the exercise scope, ensure the accuracy of the scenario and its 
applicability to the proposed exercise, participate as evaluators, and guide the creation 
and implementation of a corrective action plan to improve response. In addition, when 
developing exercises for public health it is always prudent to consult published 
guidance, such as that available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as 
well as other expert literature, in order to assure that the exercise materials reflect the 
most current and accurate information available. This is likewise the case for any 
responder discipline and its expert knowledge base.      
The EEGs obviate the need to memorize essential steps. Just as experienced pilots 
use preflight checklists to ensure review of critical steps before take-off, these public 
health EEGs prompt evaluators to look for certain evidence of planning before an 
exercise and particular decisions, actions, and work products during an exercise. As 
evaluators examine plans and observe exercise play they can take notes directly on a 
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printed copy of the EEG. They can record their observations guided by descriptions of 
elements they should expect to see. 
The Relationship Between EEGs and After Action Reports/Improvement 
Plans (AAR/IPs) 
Purposes of evaluation include the improvement of organizational and individual 
performance.10 Exercises are typically followed by close examination of the actions taken 
and decisions made by responders to determine if the exercises’ objectives were met. If 
the objectives were not met, emergency responders and planners try to identify areas 
needing improvement. They especially review deficiencies in planning, organizational 
structure, training, equipment, and personnel staffing. Their findings are captured in 
After Action Reports (AAR), and, subsequently, in Improvement Plans (IP) to address 
deficiencies.    
According to the previously mentioned DHS EEG Builder:  
Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) have been developed to assist in the 
evaluation of exercises by providing evaluators with consistent standards and 
guidelines for observation, data collection and analysis, and report writing. Using 
the EEGs can help you develop stronger and more consistent After Action 
Report/Improvement Plans (AAR/IP). EEGs provide exercise evaluators with a 
manageable tool with which they can collect data during an exercise, in a format 
allowing the easy transfer of information to the AAR/IP.11   
Limitations of the Public Health EEGs  
These public health EEGs are only a starting point for exercise evaluation. One 
limitation of these EEGs is that their content has been vetted, but they have not been 
field tested. Another limitation is their use in highly controlled and applied settings has 
not been systematically studied. Their strengths and weaknesses can best be discovered 
by using them during actual exercises.  
AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
These public health EEGs are offered for current use, but they are also offered to excite 
research in the field of exercise evaluation. Further research is proposed in the following 
areas.  
Setting Performance Standards  
For these public health EEGs, experts suggested standards for appropriate action and 
acceptable levels of quality. Performance standards for timeliness are not yet defined. 
More experience is needed to verify that the activities and tasks described in these 
instruments are the correct and necessary ones to manage a variety of public health 
emergencies. Additional study is also needed to set performance standards for 
timeliness and to further define standards for quality. Ideally, standards to define the 
actions that responders might typically take and the decisions that they are likely to 
make in various scenarios would already be worked out, vetted, tested, and agreed upon. 
Such is not the case for many disciplines, and certainly not for public health, a relative 
newcomer to the arena of emergency response.   








Furthermore, these EEGs will be most useful as assessment tools when the activities and 
tasks described in them are weighted and scored. Weights and scores reflect the relative 
contribution of each element toward achieving desired performance outcomes. For 
example, when the Epi EEG is used to evaluate performance during an outbreak 
investigation, are the tasks “Confirm the diagnosis” and “Create an interim case 
definition” equally critical? If not (e.g., if one task is more critical to identifying cases, 
contacts, and risk factors than the other) the more critical task should receive more 
weight in the assessment instrument. Expert judgment is probably the highest level of 
rigor currently available. Nevertheless, experience through widespread use should 
enable assigning realistic weights and scores to the EEG elements. 
The Need for Standardized Exercises 
To determine how well prepared one jurisdiction is compared to another, standardized 
exercises are needed. In a standardized exercise each jurisdiction conducts the exercise 
using the same scenario, under a standard set of conditions and a standard set of 
assumptions. Using standardized exercises evaluators can create an evaluation 
instrument specifically tailored to the exercise. In this manner, the entire “test” – the 
exercise and its evaluation guide – is uniform. Standardizing the “test” enables 
evaluators to judge performance more fairly and equitably across jurisdictions and 
responders. The most intriguing aspect of a standardized exercise, however, is that 
standardization enables the ability to model the effects that different responder 
decisions and actions have on the exercise objectives. When responders in an exercise 
can see the real impact their decisions and actions have on outcomes, the simulated 
experiences presented in exercises begin to more closely resemble reality.12   
CONCLUSION   
Public health responders recognize that exercises are a time-tested means to practice 
skills and prepare for real events. However, standardized instruments to guide the 
process of public health exercise evaluation are recently introduced and un-tested. 
Nevertheless, these EEGs serve an important purpose to assure that critical planning 
and performance elements are addressed and evaluated in any exercises involving the 
two capabilities presented in this article. There are no absolute “gold standards” to 
evaluate public health’s capabilities for all hazards under all conditions. Therefore, one 
cannot possibly overstress how essential are subject matter experts, emergency 
planners, exercise developers, and responders who have played in many exercises to the 
creation of more realistic exercises and better evaluation tools. Even these public health 
EEGs warrant further examination to determine if they are the best design as evaluation 
instruments. We anticipate that exercise evaluation will come to be an area of expertise 
in its own right, leading subject matter experts, exercise designers, and evaluation 
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Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation 





Description: For the purpose of this article epidemiologic surveillance and 
investigation is the capability to establish and maintain systems to collect exposure and 
disease data; analyze data; detect aberrations; investigate and confirm unusual patterns; 
actively search for persons exposed to, potentially exposed to, or ill from biologic, 
chemical, or radiologic agents; alert medical and response partners; determine factors 
that put populations at risk; communicate with the public; report on and present 
investigation findings; recommend countermeasures; and study causes of epidemics and 
toxic exposures. Epidemiologic surveillance and investigation is an iterative process. 
New information learned while conducting the activities described in this capability is 
added to known information, and many steps are then repeated to improve the 
understanding of the event. In this manner the inferences made and the conclusions 
drawn from the information evolve over time during the investigation.     
Outcome: The desired outcome is to prevent exposure to and control illness from 
infectious and toxic agents. 
Note: The evaluation instruments are designed to be modular. Not all elements 
contained in this instrument apply to every situation. Subject matter experts and other 
emergency response planners should together determine which capabilities to 
strengthen in their jurisdictions. They, then, select which instruments and which 
elements (activities, tasks, observation keys, and performance criteria) apply to the 
exercise they design. The selection of modules, and how they are applied, greatly 
depends on the particular disease or exposure chosen and its related scenario. Exercise 
developers should consult current federal program guidance relevant to the disease or 
exposure and scenario chosen in order to assure exercise materials are created using the 
most up-to-date and accurate information available.      
 








ACTIVITY 1: ONGOING SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION 
Activity Description: Monitoring disease and exposure data in the jurisdiction and 
raising awareness of unusual occurrences or patterns.13 
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Analyze surveillance data according to existing plans and protocols. 
! A knowledgeable public health professional(s) is available to receive disease 
reports 24 hours per day /7 days per week /365 days per year (24/7/365)   
! Case reports from all sources validated 
! Surveillance data monitored to watch for symptoms in exposed individuals 
! Surveillance data monitored to watch for complications in persons receiving 
medical countermeasures 
! Surveillance data monitored to direct and evaluate public health interventions 
! Surveillance data monitored to generate hypotheses for further evaluation 
! Surveillance data monitored to identify trends in target populations 
! Surveillance data monitored to identify changes in infectious agents (e.g., 
antimicrobial resistance, changes in influenza virus structure) 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 2: CASE INVESTIGATION TO CONFIRM THE OUTBREAK 
Activity Description: Determining to whom the event is occurring, what is the nature 
of the event, and when and where it is occurring (i.e., the who, what, when, where, and 
how). 
Performance Measure: Public health agency personnel make a correct 
decision whether to conduct further epidemiologic investigation.  (For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Decision-Making criteria - Whether an 
aberration in surveillance data warrants an investigation)  
Performance Measure: Health Alert Network (HAN) messages must be of 
minimally acceptable quality (applies also to health alerts generated by 
jurisdictions that have the same intent and purpose as official Health Alert 
Network alerts). (For quality criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Work Product 
Criteria - Health Alerts.)  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Confirm the existence of an unusual occurrence or event 
! Case report data interpreted to determine meaning and implications; 
epidemiologic clues evaluated 
! Syndromic surveillance data analyzed using aberration detection (if available and 
appropriate for use in given situation)  
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! Alternate explanations considered (e.g., increased clinician awareness as a result 
of recent media attention to certain diseases, new physicians or clinics in the 
vicinity, changes in diagnostic methods)14  
Confirm the diagnoses 
! Field investigation begun, as needed, to gather patient information and examine 
reported cases 
! Clinical syndrome determined 
! Epidemiologic factors determined (i.e., person, place, time) 
! Laboratory and diagnostic tests conducted (as applicable to scenario) and results 
reviewed 
Create an interim case definition 
! Inclusion criteria described 
• Clinical criteria (symptoms, signs, illness onset, and pertinent diagnostic 
tests—e.g., chest x-ray; liver enzymes; gram stain) 
• Epidemiologic criteria (person, place, and time) 
• Laboratory criteria (culture results and dates) 
! Case classified (suspected, probable, confirmed) 
! Exclusion criteria described (e.g., human monkeypox—a case without a rash that 
does not develop a rash within 10 days of onset of clinical symptoms consistent 
with monkeypox) 
Start case line listing (adapt case report form to begin case series) 
! Case definition data recorded (clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and exclusion 
criteria) 
! Established or suspected risk factors recorded 
! Demographic information recorded 
! Contact information recorded to enable follow-up 
Find cases 
! Passive surveillance increased [e.g., case definition and guidance disseminated 
via HAN and other communication methods- e.g., Epidemic Information 
Exchange (Epi-X) to facilitate case-finding] 
! Active surveillance instituted (may involve surveys, reviews of existing records 
and new admissions)  
! Media outreach considered 
Interview case-patients 
! Epidemiologists providing surge from assisting organizations used same case 
report forms as responding epidemiologists 
! Hypothesis-generating (i.e., open-ended, open-minded) questions asked  
! Case characteristics identified, sufficient to determine case status: clinical, 
epidemiologic, laboratory 
! Medical care and treatments documented 
! Disposition, complications, death documented 
! Patient demographic and contact information documented 
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! Healthcare provider contact information documented 
Identify potentially exposed individuals (i.e., trace contacts) 
! Contacts of confirmed case-patients are identified to determine exposure status 
! Demographic information recorded  
! Contact information recorded to enable follow-up 
Decide when and whether to notify law enforcement. If decision is to involve law 
enforcement: 
! Agency protocols followed in determining need to contact law enforcement 
officials 
! Law enforcement personnel needed for joint investigation notified 
! Collaboration initiated 
! Epidemiologic investigation data analyzed and interpreted in coordination with 
data from law enforcement investigation 
! Ongoing briefings conducted 
! Relevant evidence identified and collected 
! Efforts with scientific/forensic testing laboratories coordinated 
! Chain of custody maintained 
Complete line listing or create database of ill, exposed, and potentially exposed 
persons. 
! Ill, exposed, and/or potentially exposed persons identified and documented. 
! Database updated as new cases identified 
! Sufficiency of line list or database to describe cases and test hypotheses assessed 
! Need for survey considered 
 
Integrate into Incident Command System (ICS) according to plan  
! Epidemiologists received work assignments from appropriate ICS supervisor 
! Epidemiologists reported information through correct ICS chain of command 
! Epidemiologists requested resources through correct ICS chain of command 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 3: DETERMINE WHO IS AT RISK OF BECOMING ILL  
Activity Description: Collecting information about case-patients in order to identify 
traits, conditions, and circumstances that are putting people at risk to get sick.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Provide case descriptive epidemiology (how much? when? where? among whom?) 
! Cases oriented by:  
• Person (unique characteristics and attributes of the case-patients)  
• Place [where is the outbreak occurring (e.g., clustered? Along drinking 
water distribution channels? Scattered throughout the country? etc.)  
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• Time (Date of illness onset—if know onset of illness and causative 
agent’s incubation period can infer when exposed or, if know when 
exposed and onset of illness, can determine incubation period and infer 
causative agent)    
! Case counts determined (how big is the outbreak) 
! Time course of event determined 
! Epidemic (“Epi”) curve generated  
 By examining data from ill persons try to determine mode of transmission, if possible  
! Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
! Direct contact spread considered 
! Droplet spread considered   
! Airborne spread considered 
! Vehicle spread considered (e.g., food, water) 
! Vector-borne spread considered 
 By examining the “epi” curve try to infer information about exposure 
! Point source, single exposure considered 
! Point source, continuous exposure considered 
! Person-person spread considered   
! Mixed source considered 
 Conduct an additional survey(s) to gather more specific information about ill persons 
to determine who is at risk of getting sick, if needed 
! Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
! Additional questions to be asked determined   
! Survey instrument created 
! Survey conducted 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 4: USE DESCRIPTIVE EPIDEMIOLOGY TO DEVELOP A 
PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESIS ABOUT WHAT EXPOSURE COULD BE 
CAUSING THE DISEASE  
Activity Description: Taking into account all that has been learned so far in the 
investigation, make an educated guess about what exposure could be making people sick 
(e.g., ate a hamburger at restaurant X; breathed the air in a certain building; had a 
medical procedure with a particular type and brand of device). The guess must be a 
plausible explanation of the facts uncovered during the investigation.   
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Review descriptive epidemiology to formulate plausible explanations about how the 
disease is transmitted and what exposure is causing people to become ill 
! Clinical data reviewed 
! Epidemiologic data reviewed 
! Results of laboratory testing reviewed 
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! Knowledge of causative agent, if known, reviewed  
! Environmental investigation reviewed 
! Veterinary investigation reviewed, if applicable 
! Vector-borne investigation reviewed, if applicable 
! Forensic/law enforcement investigation reviewed, if applicable 
Develop a hypothesis to explain what specific exposure(s) might be causing the 
disease 
! Likely causes prioritized to guide recommendations for control measures  
! Hypothesis reviewed to ensure it is consistent with the clinical, laboratory, and 
epidemiologic facts of the investigation 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 5: CONDUCT ANALYTIC STUDY(S), IF NEEDED 
Activity Description: Some outbreaks never actually make it to the analytic study 
phase. When control measures are instituted early after the case investigation has 
begun, and they prove effective, an analytic study might be deemed un-necessary. 
However, further analytic study might be needed to test preliminary hypotheses if 1) the 
cause of the outbreak remains unknown; 2) control measures are not working; and/or; 
3) critical information necessary to better understand and monitor the event remains 
elusive. Having specific knowledge about the problem improves the ability to 
recommend measures to control it. If the preliminary hypothesis is not supported, new 
hypotheses are generated and tested. 
Test hypothesis using appropriate epidemiologic investigative tests and methods  
! Case definition applied consistently to all persons being investigated  
! Non-ill persons (controls) are selected for comparison groups using appropriate 
analytic study methods  
! Information on ill and non-ill persons analyzed 
! Appropriate statistical tests selected to test hypothesis 
! Investigation continued and new hypothesis developed, if statistical tests indicate 
no significant difference between ill and non-ill persons on the incriminated 
exposure, or if incriminated exposure does not “square” with the facts [e.g., iced 
tea (incriminated exposure) does not harbor Clostridium botulinum (case 
investigation fact)] 
Conduct an additional survey(s), as needed, to gather more specific information about 
ill and non-ill persons (controls) to determine what exposure is causing the disease 
! Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
! Additional questions to be asked determined   
! Survey instrument created 
! Survey conducted 
!!! 
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ACTIVITY 6: WRITE AND DISSEMINATE INTERIM REPORT(S) AND 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION  
Activity Description: Communicating findings is an essential step in an 
epidemiologic investigation. Reports of the investigation’s progress (interim reports) 
should be disseminated to appropriate officials per agency protocol. Epidemiologists can 
provide protective action guidance and recommend countermeasures to control an 
outbreak, but they rely on other decision-makers to take action on the guidance and 
recommendations. Therefore, epidemiologists must be able to present their thinking 
and findings in a manner that convinces others to act. At the conclusion of the 
investigation a report of the results (final report) should also be prepared, disseminated, 
and archived per public health agency protocol.  
Performance Measure: Interim reports generated during an epidemiologic 
investigation must be of minimally acceptable quality. (For quality criteria, see 
Appendix A2, Activity 6, Work Product Criteria – Interim epidemiologic investigation 
reports.). Report information will improve as investigation continues and level of 
certainty increases. 
Performance Measure: Final reports generated during an epidemiologic 
investigation must be of minimally acceptable quality. (For quality criteria, see 
Appendix A2, Activity 6, Work Product Criteria – Final epidemiologic investigation 
report) 
Draft and disseminate interim report(s) of the epidemiologic investigation. (Note: 
This step occurs frequently throughout the investigation) 
! All confirmed and suspected cases to date included by person, place, and time  
! Epidemiologic statistics reported, as needed 
! Report is disseminated to appropriate authorities per public health agency 
protocol 
 After the investigation is concluded, write and disseminate a final report. Information 
should be addressed and documented in a manner that reveals the thinking that 
underlies the investigator’s decisions and actions (i.e., “show your thinking”) 
! Report prepared consistent in content and format with public health agency 
protocol 
! Typical format used in peer-reviewed publications considered (i.e., Introduction, 
Background, Methods, Results, Discussion) 
! Report disseminated per public health agency protocol 
! Report archived per public health agency protocol 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 7: MITIGATION AND CONTAINMENT 
Activity Description: Using the findings of an epidemiologic investigation to 
recommend countermeasures to control or stop the outbreak. 
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Performance Measure: Epidemiologist’s recommendations for mitigation and 
containment strategies must be defensible (For quality criteria see Appendix A2, 
Activity 7, Decision-making Criteria for Communicable Disease - What countermeasures 
to recommend) 
Performance Measure: Epidemiologist’s presentation of findings and 
countermeasure recommendations must be of minimal acceptable quality. (For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 7, Work Product Criteria – Epidemiologist findings 
and countermeasure recommendations for policy-makers.) 
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Design mitigation and containment strategies for communicable diseases. Relevant 
epidemiologic principles considered.   
! Eliminate, control, or reduce infectiousness of reservoirs, including animal 
reservoirs 
! Reduce contact rate between susceptibles (persons susceptible to infection) and 
potential infectives (potentially infectious case-patients) considered, if applicable 
! Reduce probability potential sources are infectious (e.g., reduce the prevalence of 
infection in the community) 
! Reduce biological susceptibility of suscebtibles 
! Reduce biological infectiousness of infectives 
! Interrupt transmission between infectives and susceptibles, given contact 
! Increase herd immunity (i.e., population level effects) 
! Reduce duration of infectiousness  (i.e., provide interventions such as treatment 
or vaccination as soon as possible 
Recommend mitigation and containment strategies (For quality criteria, see Appendix 
A2, Activity 7, Work Product Criteria) 
! Population targeted to receive control measures identified (i.e., at risk 
population) 
! Appropriate measures to control disease and exposure recommended 
! Medical treatment for confirmed case-patients recommended 
Provide public health information on investigation, mitigation, and containment 
strategies to emergency public information officials for release  
! Release approved by legally recognized public health authority 
! Release provided by Joint Information Center, if ICS established 
! Interaction with public information officials continues throughout investigation 
Monitor effectiveness of mitigation steps 
! Adverse reactions of public health interventions monitored 
! Recommendations updated 
Coordinate examination of deceased suspected case-patients with the medical 
examiner and/or coroner 
! Fatality management personnel notified of deceased patients 
! Forensic and/or information provided to the medical examiner/coroner 
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! Fatality information periodically updated per protocol  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 8: INFORMATION SHARING FOR OUTBREAK OF FOODBORNE 
ILLNESS15  
Activity Description: Exchanging information with colleagues (e.g., infectious 
disease epidemiologists, laboratorians, food safety specialists, environmental health 
specialists) who contribute their own expertise to investigating and controlling an 
outbreak of foodborne illness.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Share investigation findings between infectious disease epidemiologists and assisting 
laboratorians, food safety specialists, and environmental health specialists for findings 
that relate to food facility inspection and product trace-back. 
! Initial assessments of food facilities conducted using emergency guidelines, 
Standard Operating Procedures, and applicable code  
! Product tracing conducted to determine the source, destination, and disposition, 
of adulterated or contaminated products  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 9: HUMAN HEALTH THREAT ANALYSIS FOR EXPOSURES TO 
TOXINS16  
Activity Description: Exchanging information with colleagues who contribute their 
own expertise to investigating exposures to toxins.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
Evaluate potential exposure pathways (source, fate and transport, point of exposure, 
route of exposure, susceptible population) 
! Source of chemical assessed (type, duration, and magnitude of release) 
! Delivery methods assessed (transportation routes; fate and transport in air and 
water; food and drug distribution networks) 
! Potential points of exposure where contact with agent could have occurred 
assessed (e.g., swimming area downstream of chemical plant; soil near chemical 
waste site; residential area near smoke-stack)  
! Exposure routes assessed (indigestion, inhalation, dermal, and ocular) 
! Receptor populations, including sensitive subpopulations considered (e.g., 
concentrations irritating to adults might be lethal to children) 
Identify potential acute and chronic health effects 
! Acute health effects of exposure identified 
! Chronic health effects of exposure identified 
! Increased risk of birth defects determined 
! Exposed patients tracked to enable long-term medical monitoring 
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Estimate potential effects on infrastructure and the environment 
! Safety concerns for rescue personnel working in contaminated environments 
evaluated 
! Human health threats from contamination of hospital emergency rooms and staff 
assessed 
! Increased risk for infectious diseases from lack of clean water, disruption of solid-
waste disposal services, and contact with sewage from broken pipes monitored 
! Human health threats from contamination of government emergency operations 
centers evaluated  
! Human health threats from contamination of houses, schools, and offices 
assessed 
Identify health risk communication needs 
! Adherence to the Incident Action Plan communications plan demonstrated  
! Local Emergency Planning Committee consulted  
 









(Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation)  
Planning 
 
Planning is essential to successful execution of capabilities. It helps ensure adequate 
capacity in terms of staffing, equipment required, training needs, and optimal ways to 
organize the personnel and equipment to carry out the capability.  
 
Described below are elements of planning that should be in place before an event 
(exercise or real disaster). At a minimum these elements ought to be addressed, but the 
list is certainly not exhaustive. Completion of these elements can be documented, and 
the documents can be reviewed before exercising the capability.  
Identify applicable laws, policies, and implementation procedures for public health 
reporting and notification  
! Applicable local, state, and federal laws and regulations examined 
! Due process and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requirements are followed 
! Jurisdiction’s disease reporting statutes selected conditions that require 
immediate reporting to the public health agency 
! Notifiable disease reporting laws provided to physicians, healthcare facilities, and 
laboratories  
! Updated requirements and/or guidance (from executive authority) 
communicated to healthcare providers, healthcare facilities, and laboratories 
Identify all stakeholders and agency representatives or liaisons 
! Public, private, tribal, and border government stakeholders for public health 
services identified 
! Response plan partners identified 
Identify data sources and data users 
! Sources of data identified (e.g., healthcare providers, poison control centers, 
human and animal laboratories, hospitals, infection control practitioners, media, 
general public) 
! Users of data are identified (e.g., public health practitioners, healthcare 
providers, law enforcement officials, public safety officials, elected officials) 
Coordinate resources needed to detect events of public health significance17  
! Reporting and messaging mechanisms identified (e.g., disease report phone lines, 
web-based reporting systems, fax, Health Alert Network) 
! Reporting and messaging mechanisms tested routinely or per agency schedule 
! Surveillance systems for notifiable conditions in place and assessed periodically 
for: 
• Simplicity (structure and ease of operation) 
• Flexibility (adaptable to changing information needs)  
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• Data quality (completeness and validity) 
• Acceptability (willingness of reporting sources to participate) 
• Sensitivity (case definition, detection of outbreak) 
• Representativeness (of target population over time) 
• Timeliness 
• Stability (reliability and availability) 
Coordinate resources needed to respond to events of public health significance 
! Level of competency of public health agency epidemiologists is consistent with 
their assigned roles and responsibilities18  
! Epidemiology Response Team personnel identified by name, title, and primary 
and secondary contact information 
! Epidemiology staff trained on Emergency Operations Center procedures 
! Epidemiology staff trained on National Incident Management System principles 
! Equipment to conduct routine investigations sufficient for number of 
Epidemiology Response Team personnel identified and available for use (e.g., 
personal protective equipment, information technology, communication, clinical 
sampling equipment, specimen collection material) 
! Law enforcement personnel needed for response identified 
! Procedures to notify law enforcement personnel in place 
Ensure logistics support 
! Logistical support plans in place before events to ensure continued operations 
during the incident (e.g., technical support, security, surge capacity, deployment 
procedures, transportation, equipment, supplies, relief staff, designated lead on 
epidemiology investigation team) 
Healthcare provider education 
! Educational materials (e.g., fact sheets) developed ahead of time for events of 
public health significance 
Identify, assess, and prioritize threats 
! A Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) is conducted by jurisdiction [The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides instruction regarding 
how to conduct an HVA]  
! Jurisdiction’s Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis reviewed by infectious disease 
and environmental heath epidemiologists 
! Jurisdiction HazMat teams consulted 
! Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) consulted 
! Law enforcement consulted for information on known threats in vicinity 










(Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation) 
Criteria for Performance 
 
As noted in the Introduction (see Discussion: How to Use the Public Health EEGs), 
subject matter experts are needed throughout the design and conduction of exercises 
including participation as evaluators. As evaluators they are best served with written 
standards by which to judge how well responders trained in their same field perform 
their duties. Standards for quality, though, are difficult to define. Even expert opinions 
vary. In addition, criteria that should be factored in when making decisions about 
epidemiologic investigation depend on the agent involved, though criteria regarding 
type of content and format that ought to be present in work products can be more 
standard.  Because of these challenges uniform criteria to judge quality of performance 
are rarely offered. Despite these problems we deem it essential to offer some quality 
criteria for this Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation EEG. Criteria by which to 
judge the quality of responder performance are provided in this appendix for three 
Activities: Activities 2, 6, and 7.   
 
We divided quality criteria into decision making and work products because the results 
of these efforts must be handed off to responders in other linked capabilities, who await 
them to carry out their own work. If these decisions and work products are woefully 
inferior, then the missions of fellow responders in the linked capabilities may be 
seriously compromised.  
DECISION-MAKING 
To judge decision-making performance, evaluators should listen to discussions among 
epidemiologists during the exercise and determine whether they factor any relevant 
quality criteria into their decisions. Since the criteria to be considered differ by scenario, 
epidemiologists must participate in development of the exercise scenario to determine 
which criteria apply and under which conditions. The criteria they select as relevant are 
then included in the EEG, modified as necessary for the exercise. We propose quality 
criteria for two critical decisions: (1) whether an aberration in surveillance data warrants 
an investigation and (2) what countermeasures to recommend. 
WORK PRODUCTS 
To judge performance using work product criteria, evaluators should examine the 
relevant work products for quality content and format. We propose quality criteria for 
three work products: (1) Health Alerts, (2) interim and final epidemiologic investigation 
reports, and (3) epidemiologist findings and countermeasure recommendations for 
policy-makers.  
!!! 
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ACTIVITY 2: CASE INVESTIGATION TO CONFIRM THE OUTBREAK 
Decision-making Criteria - Whether an aberration in surveillance data warrants an 
investigation  
 Use epidemiologic clues consistent with those described in “Epidemiology of 
Bioterrorism”19 to decide whether to conduct further epidemiologic investigation  
! Presence of a large epidemic, with greater case loads than expected, especially in 
a discrete population (number of new case reports compared with baseline case 
reports) 
! More severe disease than expected for a given pathogen; unusual routes of 
exposure 
! Disease unusual for a given geographic area; found outside the normal 
transmission season; impossible to transmit naturally in the absence of normal 
vector for transmission 
! Multiple simultaneous epidemics of different diseases 
! Disease outbreak with zoonotic as well as human consequences 
! Unusual strains or variants of organisms or antimicrobial resistance patterns 
disparate from those circulating 
! Higher attack rates for those exposed in certain areas, such as inside a building if 
an aerosol was released indoors, or lower rates for in those inside a building if 
aerosol released outdoors 
! Intelligence that an adversary has access to a particular agent(s) 
! Claims by a terrorist of the release of a biologic agent 
! Direct evidence of the release of an agent, with findings of equipment, munitions, 
or tampering 
Work Product Criteria - Health Alerts  
Include quality content in Health Alert
20
  
! Description of the problem provided (e.g., large numbers of patients with rapid 
onset of high fever followed by muscle aches, headache, and sore throat) 
! Time period during which problem is unfolding described 
! Magnitude of the problem (i.e., number of cases) described 
! Case definition for probable, suspected, and confirmed case (clinical, 
epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria) described, as information becomes 
available 
! Exclusion criteria described 
! Request to report suspected and probable cases issued 
! Instructions regarding to whom cases should be reported provided 
! Point of contact for more information provided  
! Statement of intent to provide further updates included 
! Statement that underscores urgency to report included  
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Use quality format when presenting Health Alerts
21
  
! Bold, succinct subject line included 
! A unique identifier included 
! Date and time of issue included 
! Level of message urgency identified 
! Audience to whom the message is directed specified 
! Name, title, and contact information of the person(s) responsible for issuing the 
message included 
! Required action steps specified 
! Instructions to share information with targeted audiences included 
! Instructions to provide a point-of-contact or website address for more 
information included 
! Public health agency’s emergency contact information included in a prominent 
location 
! Estimated time for follow-up included, if the message was of the highest priority 
! Page numbers on each page and total number of pages identified 
! Content and format approved and authorized for dissemination according to 
public health agency protocol [or incident commander, unified command, or 
joint information center officer, if operating under National Incident 
Management System] 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 6: WRITE AND DISSEMINATE INTERIM REPORT(S) AND 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION   
Work Product Criteria – Interim epidemiologic investigation reports 
Include quality content in interim epidemiologic investigation reports 
! Information tailored to intended audience 
! Description of the problem provided 
! Statement about ongoing nature of investigation included 
! Case ascertainment elements specified  
! Number of cases found to date (time of report) provided 
! Statement of whether countermeasures were implemented included  
! Target population for countermeasures identified 
! Barriers to countermeasure implementation identified 
! Status of descriptive and analytic studies provided  
! Statement of whether countermeasures depend on results of analytic studies 
included 
! Findings of descriptive and analytic studies provided 
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Work Product Criteria – Final epidemiologic investigation report 
Include quality content in final epidemiologic investigation report 
! How notified or found out about the problem documented 
! How investigated the problem documented 
! Evidence on which based recommendations documented 
! Recommendations made documented 
! Effect of implementing recommendations documented 
! Reasons why recommendations were not or (could not) be implemented 
documented, if applicable 
! Further follow-up needed, if applicable 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 7: MITIGATION AND CONTAINMENT 
Decision-making Criteria for Communicable Disease - What countermeasures 
to recommend  
Use epidemiologic principles, in particular the basic reproductive number (R0), where 
R0=dcp; d, the duration of infectiousness; c, the contact rate with susceptible hosts; and 
p the transmission probability—the probability of infecting the susceptible host when 
contact occurs, to decide what countermeasure strategies to recommend.22 
Interventions considered to: 
! Eliminate, control, or reduce infectiousness of reservoirs, including animal 
reservoirs 
! Reduce contact rate between susceptibles (persons susceptible to infection) and 
potential  infectives (potentially infectious case-patients) 
• Change behavior (host and or source; e.g., reduce crowding, heed travel 
advisories) 
• Find infectives—case finding--for intervention (e.g., isolation) 
• Isolate infectives  
• Trace susceptibles—contact tracing--for intervention (e.g., quarantine) 
• Quarantine exposed susceptibles [individual, community, geographic 
boundary (cordon sanitaire)] 
• Shelter-in-place (self-imposed separation of non-exposed persons) 
• Reduce number of infectives (e.g., fewer infectives encountered) 
• Promote social distancing (e.g., school closures, cancellation of mass 
gatherings, etc.) 
! Reduce probability potential sources are infectious (e.g., reduce the prevalence of 
infection in community) 
• Find infectives –case finding--for intervention (e.g., isolation, treatment) 
• Identify and control infectives 
• Vaccinate [i.e., induce immunity (noninfectious), or partial immunity (less 
infectious)] 
 
! Reduce biological susceptibility of susceptibles 
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• Vaccinate susceptibles (pre- and post-exposure) (i.e., susceptible generates 
own antibodies) 
• Give immune globulin (pre- and post-exposure) (susceptible given pre-
formed antibodies) 
• Give antimicrobial drug (pre- and post-exposure) 
• Treat co-factor (e.g., treat ulcerated or non-intact skin) 
! Reduce biological infectiousness of infectives 
• Treat case-patients 
• Vaccinate [i.e., induce immunity (noninfectious), or partial immunity (less 
infectious)] 
! Interrupt transmission between infectives and susceptibles, given contact 
• Physical barriers and chemical methods (masks, respirators, goggles, gloves, 
hand sanitizers, etc.) 
• Engineering controls (e.g., HEPA filters, negative pressure rooms) 
• Environmental controls (e.g., dis-infection, decontamination) 
! Increase herd immunity (population level effects).   
• Naturally acquired immunity  
• Fraction vaccinated (vaccine coverage) 
• Fraction fully protected (vaccine efficacy) 
! Reduce duration of infectiousness (i.e., provide interventions such as treatment 
or vaccination as soon as possible) 
Work Product Criteria -  Epidemiologist findings and countermeasure 
recommendations for policy-makers 




! Problem discovered during investigation orally and visually described (e.g., can of 
tainted food, pictures of disease) 
! Number of cases found to date and time presented 
! Inferences and conclusions drawn from findings to date and time of presentation 
described 
! Countermeasure recommendations presented 
! Target population for countermeasures identified 
! Reasons for recommendations provided 
! Likely benefits and possible consequences of following recommendations 
described 
! Possible consequences of not following recommendations described 
! Alternative options offered, if any are being considered, and likely consequences 
discussed 
! Barriers to implementing countermeasures identified 
 
 
Use quality format when presenting epidemiologist findings and countermeasure 
recommendations
24
   
! Simple, clear language used; use of technical jargon minimized 
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! Active voice, action verbs used 
! Concise sentences used 
! Information logically sequenced 
! Thinking obviously organized 
! Important information summarized 
! Presentation stays within allotted time 
! Handouts, if used, track with order of material presented 
! Visual aids (e.g., props and pictures) enhance, support, exemplify, and/or 
facilitate understanding of material covered 








Isolation and Quarantine 




Description: For the purpose of this article isolation and quarantine are defined as 
movement-restriction interventions to prevent the transmission of contagious illness. 
Isolation refers to the identification, separation, and restriction of movement of persons 
who are known to be ill with a contagious disease. Quarantine refers to the 
identification, separation, and restriction of movement of persons who have been 
exposed to a contagious disease but who may or may not become ill; such persons are 
potentially infectious. 
Because both of these interventions curtail a person’s right to freedom of movement, 
most public health officials hope affected persons will comply voluntarily with isolation 
and quarantine instructions. Occasionally, though, a court order is needed to enforce the 
restrictions. High priority must be given to gaining public cooperation with isolation 
and quarantine measures. Special attention must be paid to subpopulations of persons 
who might need additional assistance to understand and comply with isolation and 
quarantine interventions. Wherever these persons are confined (at home, in hospitals, 
or at alternate care facilities), they need information and support. They might need help 
getting food; monitoring their health; understanding altered workplace and school 
expectations; providing childcare, eldercare, or pet care; or finding financial assistance. 
Therefore, to be successful, isolation and quarantine involve the entire community. 
Typically, the isolation and quarantine capability covers only contagious biological 
agents, leaving toxic chemical or radioactive agents to be covered by the 
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response Capability. However, because the process of 
involuntary movement restriction for persons who might expose others to toxins or 
radioactive agents (e.g., by refusing decontamination) is similar to that for persons who 
might spread infectious agents, a special activity called Emergency Detention for 
Chemical or Radiation Exposure is included in this Isolation and Quarantine EEG. 
Outcome: The desired outcome is a limited spread of a newly introduced contagious 
disease. Persons who are infectious or potentially infectious are separated from others, 
prohibited from leaving confinement areas, provided with basic necessities of life, and 
monitored for health. Legal authority for these measures is clearly defined and 
communicated to the public. Logistical support is provided until the danger of 
transmission resides. 
Note: The evaluation instruments are designed to be modular. Not all elements 
contained in this instrument apply to every situation. Subject matter experts and other 
emergency response planners should together determine which capabilities to 
strengthen in their jurisdictions. They then select which instruments and which 
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elements (activities, tasks, observation keys, and performance criteria) apply to the 
exercise they design. The selection of modules, and how they are applied, greatly 
depends on the particular disease or exposure chosen and its related scenario. Exercise 
developers should consult current federal program guidance relevant to the disease or 
exposure and scenario chosen in order to assure exercise materials are created using the 
most up-to-date and accurate information available. 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 1: ORGANIZING INTO A TIER 3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
MEDICAL OPERATIONS FUNCTIONAL AREA (As Appropriate)  
Activity Description: Organizing in a Tier 3 Public Health and Medical Operations 
Functional Area when public health is the lead agency in a Unified Command or when 
supporting the jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center as lead for Emergency 
Support Function #8 (ESF#8).25  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Organize within a public health and medical functional area in a National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)–compliant management structure  
! Isolation and quarantine operations logically aligned with hospital operations to 
facilitate coordination of effort  
Use NIMS to coordinate support for Isolation and Quarantine activities and ensure 
that overall incident objectives and priorities are met 
! Requests for personnel, equipment, and supplies made through the jurisdiction’s 
Incident Command System(ICS)/NIMS structure 
! Requests for support made by using correct ICS forms 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 2: PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION—LAWFUL 
DISCLOSURE 
Activity Description: Handling protected health information according to privacy 
standards established pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA).26  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Comply with HIPAA  
! As needed, covered entities (health plans, healthcare clearing houses, healthcare 
providers) informed about lawful disclosure of protected health information--
without authorization from persons whose information is being released-- when 
public health authorities, who are legally authorized to collect or receive the 
information, request it  
! Covered entities comply with legitimate information requests from public health 
authorities 
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! Public health authorities comply with regulations regarding use of disclosed 
protected health information  
Resolve issues about protected health information  
! Public health legal advisors functioned as Technical Specialists in the ICS 
Planning Section, or wherever their specialized services are required 
! Public health legal advisors helped resolve disputes or questions about lawful 
disclosure of protected health information  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 3: EVALUATION OF PATIENT AND DETERMINATION OF NEED 
FOR MOVEMENT RESTRICTION 
Activity Description: Using epidemiologic, medical, and laboratory data to determine 
if person needs to be isolated or quarantined to protect the rest of the population and to 
assure adequate treatment and monitoring. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Identify persons who require isolation   
! Whether person is suspected or confirmed to be infected with a contagious 
pathogen is  established based on signs, symptoms, and available laboratory 
findings 
Identify persons who should be quarantined 
! Whether person has been exposed to, or has likely been exposed to, a contagious 
pathogen, or has arrived from an established high-risk area  
Consider relevant factors to decide whether to separate the person from the rest of the 
population and restrict his/her movement. The following are considered:  
• Pathogen factors (e.g., virulence, infectious dose, infectivity, ease and mode of 
transmission) 
• Host factors (e.g., susceptibility of the population, availability of treatment, 
effectiveness of treatment)  
• Environment factors (e.g., ability to achieve and enforce separation)  
• Legal factors (e.g., authority to isolate or quarantine based on the specific 
pathogen suspected or known) 
Decide whether to isolate, quarantine, or release the individual 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 4: APPROPRIATE SETTING SELECTION 
Activity Description: Considering individual needs, circumstances, and exposure risk 
to family members and primary caregivers when selecting appropriate setting for 
isolation or quarantine.27   
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Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Use answers to the following questions to determine appropriate settings: 
! Person needs hospital-level of care? (yes = hospital; no = home or facility) 
! Person can care for himself/herself? (yes = home; no = facility) 
! Person can monitor himself/herself for symptom deterioration? (yes = home; no 
= facility) 
! Person can minimize close contacts and contact with immuno-compromised 
persons in the household? (yes = home; no = facility) 
! A healthy primary caregiver is available? (yes = home; no = facility) 
! Person can stay in a home locally? (yes = home; no = facility (e.g., homeless, 
transient, tourist, business traveler, foreign traveler, displaced person, etc.) 
! Home is near a facility that can provide a higher level of medical care (yes = 
home; no = facility) 
! Person is willing to remain in isolation or quarantine for the full duration 
required? (yes =  home;  no = facility)  
! Person is in quarantine and deemed an essential worker? (yes = consider work 
quarantine; no = work quarantine not an option) 
Decide an appropriate setting. The following considered:  
! Airborne infection isolation room in hospital 
! Home (including working from home) 
! Alternate healthcare facility  
! Work  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 5: VOLUNTARY ISOLATION OR QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Seeking voluntary compliance with isolation and quarantine 
recommendations as the preferred and least restrictive means to separate infectious or 
potentially infectious persons from susceptible persons in the rest of the population. 
However, this option is also the most difficult to enforce and track, as few public health 
resources are available to monitor compliance.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Determine if persons requiring isolation or quarantine can and will comply 
voluntarily  
! Requests for voluntary compliance with isolation or quarantine issued only by 
authorized officials  
! Person agrees to comply with movement restrictions 
! Person demonstrates understanding of reasons for isolation or quarantine by re-
stating reasons in his/her own words 
! Person demonstrates understanding that consequences of not adhering to 
voluntary  movement restrictions can be court ordered confinement by re-stating 
consequences in his/her own words 
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! Person describes living circumstances that enable compliance (e.g., has a phone 
to enable monitoring, has family or friends who are willing to assist him, has 
stable housing situation)  
! Person demonstrates understanding of public health official’s monitoring and 
treatment instructions by discussing instructions with official and describing how 
he/she will carry out the instructions 
Provide documents and instructions in person’s primary language 
! Reasons for isolation or quarantine provided  
! Instructions and guidance while under restriction provided in primary language 
to affected person and caregiver(s) 
! Estimate of time expected to remain in isolation or quarantine provided  
! Procedures for release from isolation or quarantine provided  
"Obtain informed consent 
! Persons entering voluntary isolation or quarantine are asked to acknowledge 
their understanding of and agreement with the terms of the restriction, person 
informed of terms, understanding verified, and consent documented per agency 
protocol 
Track person  
! Relevant information recorded and entered into a database to facilitate 
monitoring of health status and compliance with movement restriction 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 6: INVOLUNTARY ISOLATION OR QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Compelling involuntary compliance with isolation and 
quarantine orders to separate infectious or potentially infectious persons from 
susceptible persons in the rest of the population.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Decide whether to order involuntary movement restriction for persons who pose a 
threat to the population.  The following should be considered: 
! Disease factors [e.g., highly contagious infection, stage of disease that person is in 
(perhaps no longer infectious), no or very limited treatment available]  
! Likelihood of compliance factors (e.g., person is a flight risk, is irresponsible, is 
unreliable) 
! If contemplating a federal quarantine order, the disease must be one listed as 
quarantinable in executive order(s).   
! Availability of resources to enforce and monitor (an especially relevant 
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Determine which legal authorities to invoke  
! If public health officer has and exercises his/her own authority to order 
detention, written order signed, with date and time, using proper procedures and 
forms per agency protocol 
! If state/local public health officer issues detention order, court officials notified 
in order to facilitate appeals and future court proceedings  
! If court-ordered detention sought, state/local public health officials and/or their 
legal advisors contact court officials to petition a judge (or magistrate) for the 
order using proper procedures and forms per agency protocol 
Provide reasons why involuntary movement restriction is required 
! Irrespective of the legal authority invoked, public health officials provided, in 
writing, the reasons and evidence to support an order for involuntary isolation or 
quarantine 
Deliver detention order 
! Arrangements made with law enforcement officials to serve the detention order, 
if law enforcement is needed 
Arrange transport of person to site of isolation or quarantine 
! Arrangements made with transport officials, if special transport is needed 
Track person  
! Relevant information recorded and entered into a database to facilitate 
monitoring of health status and movement restriction 
Prepare for detention hearing (typically 48–72 hours after initial detention order)  
! Evidence and statements prepared by public health officials for the hearing, 
during which government officials issuing or obtaining the initial detention 
order, the patient and/or his/her attorney, and a judge are present to hear 
arguments for and against continuing the involuntary restriction of patient’s 
movement  
! To avoid risk of infecting persons attending court proceedings, patient does not 
appear in person, but rather is represented by an attorney, if possible 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSE PERSONNEL 
Activity Description: Ensuring that response personnel likely to come in contact with 
contagious persons use recommended personal protective equipment (PPE), follow 
protective action recommendations, and are offered appropriate prophylaxis and 
treatment  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Prepare the incident medical plan (ICS Form 206) to protect and manage responder 
health  
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! Recommendations for personal protective equipment, pre-exposure prophylaxis, 
and other protective actions to minimize exposure risk for responders assisting 
infectious and potentially infectious patients provided to the ICS Safety Officer in 
the Incident Medical Plan prepared by the Logistics Section, Medical Unit  
! Recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis and treatment, if available, 
described in the Incident Medical Plan  
! Recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis and treatment, if available, 
offered to responders who are accidentally exposed to contagious patients 
! Court officials, attorneys, law enforcement officers, patient transporters, human 
services personnel, and others supporting isolation and quarantine operations 
included as responders 
! Isolation and quarantine for sick or exposed responders considered 
Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) specialist, if available, assists responders 
! Responders coping with the psychological and emotional stress of managing a 
significant event involving contagious illness offered help of CISM specialist 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 8: HEALTH STATUS MONITORING  
Activity Description:  Assuring persons receive regular attention to detect trends in 
health status and problems with compliance.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Monitor health status of confined persons 
! Confined person’s health status monitored per agency protocol (e.g., daily visit, 
daily phone call, health status logged, etc.) 
! If health status deteriorates, action taken to re-evaluate need for higher level of 
medical care 
! If health status improves, action taken to re-evaluate need for confinement 
! Self-monitoring guidance issued, if appropriate 
Monitor compliance with movement restrictions 
! Confined person’s compliance with movement restrictions monitored per agency 
protocol  
! If confined person is non-compliant with movement restrictions, action taken to 
re-evaluate need for higher level of restriction and enforcement (e.g., change 
individual from voluntary to involuntary isolation or quarantine, use electronic 
monitoring device [e.g., ankle bracelet], assign law enforcement to guard patient, 
incarcerate) 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 9: SITE ASSESSMENT  
Activity Description: Evaluating the suitability of a person’s home, a healthcare 
facility (e.g., isolation wards in sections of or in entire hospitals), or an alternative 
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healthcare facility (e.g., clinic, nursing home, school, auditorium, convention center, 
hotel, cruise ship) as a site for isolation or quarantine. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Evaluate all site types for basic necessities. The following considered:  
! Ability to practice social distancing among quarantinees 
! Utilities (water, electricity, garbage collection, bio-hazardous waste handling, 
heating and air conditioning) 
! Ability to isolate airflow to prevent spread of micro-organisms through heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system (if airborne precautions 
indicated) 
! Acceptable ventilation  
! Lavatories and showers 
! Laundry facilities and supplies, including diaper service  
! Food preparation areas  
! Essential supplies (clothing, food, hand hygiene, thermometers, fever log, other 
medical equipment and supplies) 
! Mechanism for addressing special needs (e.g., filling prescriptions)  
! Methods for communication, including telephone (for monitoring by health staff, 
reporting of symptoms, gaining access to support services, and communicating 
with family)  
! Proximity to higher levels of care 
! Ability to monitor health, including provision of areas to conduct temperature 
checks, etc. 
Evaluate person’s home for special considerations. The following considered:  
! The isolated person can be confined to a room in the home furthest from high-
traffic areas with the least opportunity for disease spread. This room has a 
closeable door.  
! The isolated person has access to a separate bathroom that will not be used by 
others during the period of isolation 
! Room ventilation is cut off from home’s central air conditioning unit, and room is 
frequently vented to the outside of the house (i.e., windows opened as often as 
possible), (if airborne precautions indicated) 
! Pets are removed from the household and alternative pet care is found  
Evaluate healthcare or alternative healthcare facility for special considerations. The 
following considered:  
! Availability of airborne infection isolation rooms (if indicated) 
! Bed capacity and spatial separation of patients (social distancing) 
! Potential for makeshift negative pressure zones  
! Availability of autoclave  
! Ability to support designated level of care for ill patients (e.g., suction, oxygen 
available, if needed)  
! Ease of transporting patients to and within the facility (e.g., doors wide enough 
for gurneys) 
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! Ease of decontaminating and/or disinfecting rooms 
! Ease of securing the building  
! Ease of allowing family to visit the seriously ill  
! Proximity to residential areas  
! Proximity to space for staff, family members, clergy, counselors, equipment, 
supplies, food preparation, laboratory, decontamination, and mortuary  
! Access in and out of facility is controlled 
! Willingness of facility owner to allow structure to be used as an isolation facility  
! Ability to use a facility based on legal authority, if location not previously 
identified 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 10: WORK QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining at work. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Decide whether to allow work quarantine  
! Determine if worker considered essential to maintaining critical infrastructure 
(e.g., healthcare workers, police, fire fighters, utility workers) 
Establish work quarantine 
! Quarantined persons stay home at all times when not working or stay at work, if 
home or alternative quarantine facilities are unavailable  
! Transportation arrangements for quarantined persons moving between home or 
facility quarantine and work ensure no exposure to susceptible persons, or person 
in quarantine uses barriers (e.g., mask and gloves, as appropriate) to minimize 
exposure to susceptible persons  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 11: ENTIRE FACILITY QUARANTINE 
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining an entire facility 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Decide whether to quarantine an entire facility if  
• Facility has experienced a high potential for exposure  
• Facility has a particularly high case count 
! Quarantine of entire facility considered because above conditions met 
Establish facility quarantine  
! Quarantined persons cohorted (when necessary) with family, friends, or persons 
exposed under similar circumstances 
! Efforts made to create makeshift negative pressure rooms or corridors, as 
appropriate  
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! Facility layout arranged for easy removal of quarantined persons to isolation, if 
signs or symptoms develop 
! Facility layout arranged for efficient monitoring, observation, and care  
! Temporary facilities (e.g., for food and laundry services) erected, if necessary 
! Generators are used to provide energy, heating, and cooling, if basic utilities are 
otherwise unavailable  
! Special arrangements and procedures for work quarantine are implemented for 
first responders and medical personnel  
! Access in and out of facility is controlled  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 12: ENTIRE COMMUNITY QUARANTINE (CORDON SANITAIRE) 
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining an entire 
geographic area such as an apartment complex, neighborhood, or section of 
community.28  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Decide to quarantine an entire geographic area if 
• The area has experienced a high potential for exposure  
• The area has a particularly high case count 
! Quarantine of entire community considered because above conditions met  
Establish quarantine perimeters 
! The size of perimeters that limit where the quarantine begins and end 
determined 
! Access controls into and out of quarantined area established by security or law 
enforcement officials  
! Access controls included setting-up buffer or warm zones between the quarantine 
(hot zone) and non-quarantine regions to limit contacts and facilitate delivery of 
essential goods and services, if appropriate 
! Access to hot zone permitted only to persons with properly authorized credentials 
! Special access provided to those requiring temporary entrance into quarantine 
(e.g., work quarantines, service providers, law enforcement, family members, 
friends, critical service providers, emergency responders, and business continuity 
staff)  
! Vehicles for transporting quarantined persons available, as needed  
! A transport call center to track and coordinate transport to and from quarantine  
established, in coordination with the local emergency management system and 
law enforcement officials and public health  
! Facilities established and maintained for nonresidents, homeless, and dislocated 
persons within the quarantined community  
!!! 
ACTIVITY 13: PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS  
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Activity Description: Differentiating between normal stress reactions and mental 
illness to provide appropriate care and support. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Promote normalcy 
! People confined in isolation and quarantine and the population at large provided 
access to an ongoing, reliable flow of credible information about the disaster and 
associated relief efforts 
! Persons confined in isolation and quarantine provided with means to contact 
family and friends (particularly important in the case of isolation, when family 
members are most worried about their sick relatives) 
! If death of a person in isolation is imminent, family members permitted into 
isolation area provided they use appropriate personal protective equipment and 
are willing to enter quarantine after the visit, if necessary  
! Normal cultural and religious events maintained or re-established (including 
grieving rituals conducted by religious practitioners)   
! Children and adolescents in quarantine provided access to formal or informal 
schooling and recreational activities 
! Adults and adolescents in quarantine provided concrete, purposeful, common-
interest activities to participate in  
Provide psychological first aid29  
! Non-intrusive pragmatic care focused on listening to affected persons, but not 
forcing them to talk 
! Basic needs assessed and met to a reasonable extent  
! Company from significant others encouraged, but not forced 
! Basic information about common reactions to stress and trauma provided 
Coordinate care for mentally ill 
! Care for urgent psychiatric complaints provided   
! Relevant treatment for persons with pre-existing psychiatric disorders 
maintained to avoid harmful, sudden discontinuation of medications 
!!! 
ACTIVITY 14: EMERGENCY DETENTION FOR CHEMICAL OR RADIATION 
EXPOSURE  
Activity Description: Identifying, separating, and restricting movement of persons 
who may have been exposed to a toxic or radioactive contaminant and can, therefore, 
potentially contaminate others. Persons exposed to toxic chemicals or radiation are 
expected to comply voluntarily with decontamination; their cooperation is typically 
assumed. Note: This activity will typically be led by law enforcement officials in 
collaboration with healthcare providers. The role of public health in this situation is to 
help characterize the event and differentiate infectious disease from chemical and 
radioactive materials exposure.  
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Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
Decide whether to order involuntary movement restriction and decontamination for 
persons who refuse decontamination and, therefore, pose a threat to others. The 
following considered: 
! Contaminant factors (e.g., likelihood that contaminant poses a significant 
exposure risk to others, amount of contamination present, no or limited 
treatment available)  
! Patient factors (e.g., patient is incoherent from effects of exposure, is a flight risk, 
is irresponsible, is unreliable) 
Determine which legal authorities to invoke  
! If immediate detention required because of imminent and substantial risk of 
serious harm to self or others, peace officers (in many jurisdictions) can detain 
without a warrant 
! If public health officer has and exercises his/her own authority to order 
detention, written order signed, with date and time, using proper procedures and 
forms per agency protocol 
! If public health officer issues detention order, court officials notified in order to 
facilitate appeals and future court proceedings  
! If court ordered detention sought, public health officials and/or their legal 
advisors contact court officials to petition a judge (or magistrate) for the order 















(Isolation and Quarantine) 
Planning 
 
Planning is essential to successful execution of capabilities. It helps ensure adequate 
capacity in terms of staffing, equipment required, training needs, and optimal ways to 
organize the personnel and equipment to carry out the capability.  
Described below are elements of planning that should be in place before an event 
(exercise or real disaster). At a minimum these elements ought to be addressed, but the 
list is certainly not exhaustive. Completion of these elements can be documented, and 
the documents can be reviewed before exercising the capability.  
Ensure incident planning activities are consistent with established National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) preparedness guidance.30 The following planning activities 
are consistent with NIMS guidance: 
! Exercises, consistent with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) principles and practices 
! Personnel qualification and certification 
! Equipment acquisition and certification  
! Mutual aid agreements 
! Publications management  
! Information and intelligence management 
Ensure that emergency operations plans follow NIMS principles. The following NIMS 
principles are evident in jurisdiction’s emergency operations plans:  
! Common terminology 
! Modular organization  
! Management by objectives 
! Reliance on an Incident Action Plan 
! Manageable span of control 
! Pre-designated locations and facilities 
! Comprehensive resource management 
! Integrated communications 
! Establishment and transfer of command 
! Chain of command and unity of command 
! Unified command 
! Accountability 
! Deployment 
Establish applicable isolation and quarantine laws, policies, and procedures to do the 
following:31   
! Declare  a public health emergency  
! Remove and detain suspected or confirmed cases, contacts, and/or carriers who 
are or may be endangering the public health  
! Accept custody of detained persons from federal quarantine officers  
! Order mass quarantine  
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! Close public venues  
! Restrict intrastate and interstate modes of transportation  
! Order isolation and quarantine  
! Conduct judicial review  
! Terminate isolation and quarantine orders  
Identify by person, job title, and contact information the persons who have legal 
authority to implement applicable isolation and quarantine laws, policies, and 
procedures 
! Persons in jurisdiction identified 
! Persons in jurisdictions of neighboring cities, counties, states, tribal 
governments, military installations, and cross-border foreign governments, 
identified as applicable  
Provide evidence that jurisdiction emergency response plans show coordination 
among the following organizations and agencies: 
! Emergency management agency 
! Jurisdiction public health agencies, including tribal and military 
! Jurisdiction hospitals, including tribal and military 
! Law enforcement 
! Public safety  
! Jurisdiction judiciary and legal counsel to governing authorities  
! Public works (for retrieval and disposal of contaminated articles) 
! Public and private providers of critical goods and services (e.g., food, water, 
medical supplies, medical gas, clean linens, internet services, home healthcare, 
childcare, and eldercare for essential workers)  
Ensure access to mainstream communications channels 
! Relationships with contacts in the broadcast media developed and maintained 
! Emergency Alert System (EAS) and other warning systems periodically tested 
Develop a civic network or Community Outreach Information Network of trusted 
leaders within the community’s subpopulations to disseminate information outside of 
mainstream communication channels32  
! Subpopulations in the jurisdiction who cannot (or will not) receive, understand, 
or act on Isolation and Quarantine messages, or who might need special 
assistance are defined. These subpopulations may need assistance because of  
• economic disadvantage  
• limited language proficiency 
• disability (physical, mental, cognitive, sensory) 
• isolation (geographic [e.g., extremely rural], cultural [e.g., religious sect], 
social [e.g., homeless]  
• age 
! Subpopulations located and mapped by using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS), highlighted streets maps, or other mapping techniques and forms of visual 
display 
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! Members of a community outreach information network, or other trusted 
information channels, identified to function as “nodes” that will convey messages 
to persons and households in the community (e.g., church outreach coordinators, 
homeowner association leaders, club administrators) 
! Ability to reliably reach Community Outreach Information Network (COIN) 
members, or persons functioning as “nodes,” and get acknowledgement that 
messages are received is exercised 
! Persons and households in the subpopulations randomly sampled to assess 
awareness and understanding of disseminated messages 
Train relevant staff in disease exposure control measures and proper use of personal 
protective equipment 
! Staff who should be trained are identified 
! Training records maintained 
Develop educational materials for isolation and quarantine. The following materials 
are developed:   
! Disease fact sheets  
! Frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding isolation and quarantine  
! Proper setup of a home isolation room 
! Social distancing 
Provide evidence of planning for employees (applies to business sector)33   
! Sick leave policies coordinated to support public health recommendations 
! Businesses prepared to extend (and ask for) grace periods for financial 
obligations affected by the emergency 
! Employee volunteerism to assist in emergencies encouraged 
! Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) developed 
! Business and public health leaders plan together 
Perform community-wide inventory  
! Total number of hospital isolation beds available determined  
! Feasibility of alternative sites for additional isolation capacity determined 
! Stockpiles of personal protective equipment (e.g., N-95 respirators, surgical 
masks, goggles, face shields, gowns) established before events; contracts in place 
for rapid replenishment, if needed  
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Emergency Response, Public Health and Poison Control: 
Logical Linkages for Successful Risk Communication and 
Improved Disaster and Mass Incident Response 
Valerie A. Yeager 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security established a broad mission 
to find ways to improve homeland security.1 In addition to preventing and 
mitigating disasters, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
highlighted the need to develop complimentary systems to avoid duplication and 
increase collaboration and coordination.2 Progress toward these objectives will 
ensure more effective responses to all hazards faced by Americans and contribute 
to the overall mission of improved security. This essay explores the possibilities 
of linking emergency response and public health with the poison control system 
for increased collaboration and coordination during disasters and emergencies. If 
successful, these linkages will ensure that we are more capable of effectively 
preventing, responding to, and recovering from disasters and emergencies. The 
provision of accurate public information and active surveillance, prevention of 
avoidable of surges in medical need, continuity of response operations, 
mitigation of public anxiety, and cost-savings for the health care system make 
Poison Control Centers a natural ally for disaster response agencies and public 
health.3  
Disasters and Emergencies Require Consistent and 
Accurate Public Information 
Recent natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, terrorist events such as 
the Oklahoma City Bombing and the events of 9/11, and public health incidents 
such as Salmonella and Escherichia coli (E. coli) outbreaks all required effective 
risk communication and safety guidance during and after the events.4 Currently, 
however, Americans do not have a consistent mechanism for the timely and 
repeated delivery of trustworthy public safety and health information.5 Most 
Americans rely on information translated through mass media before, during, 
and after a disaster or emergency incident; but the inherent flaw in this system is 
that we cannot ensure the consistent and accurate translation of crucial public 
safety and health information.  
As in most countries, Americans endeavor to discern between the factual and 
sensationalized information delivered through mass media. Additionally, people 
experiencing extreme anxiety or fear during a disaster or emergency incident will 
want assistance making health-related decisions, but the mass media cannot 
answer individual questions.6 When we experience extreme anxiety and fear, we 
seek reliable, trustworthy, and knowledgeable advice from respected individuals 
such as the police, the government, and medical professionals.7 This is inherently 
problematic during and immediately after disasters as there may be no direct 
connections to these agencies or officials. In most mass casualty and disaster 
events, these officials will be heavily taxed by the response to the event and will 
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likely be unable to handle the mass inquires and calls for personalized 
information and guidance.8 
In light of this dilemma and in response to the 2002 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, there exists great potential to increase collaboration and 
coordination and utilize the well-developed infrastructure present in the poison 
control system.9 This system currently has the potential to provide for immediate, 
and consistent personalized public information during and after a disaster or 
emergency incident. The poison control network is well established. In its fifty-
five years of service it has become well known and trusted among the American 
public as a source of reliable information.  
Mitigating Unnecessary Medical Surges 
Public information is crucial during disasters and mass incidents. Efficient 
person-to-person information mitigates worry and potentially keeps people from 
rushing to an emergency room for answers.10 Fear and anxiety are mediated by 
information; therefore it is essential that we strive to find a mechanism to 
provide the public with a reliable system for receiving accurate and consistent 
information during a disaster or emergency incident.11  
A recent study highlighted the crucial role of adequate public health 
information during disasters and mass incidents.12 It found that the American 
public will indeed seek out protective information and guidance during a disaster 
or mass incident.13 If social distancing measures are implemented (requesting 
that individuals remain at home unless absolutely necessary) people will want a 
means to reach trusted health professionals from their homes. Without adequate 
and sometimes personalized information, people who are concerned that they 
may be ill or exposed to the infectious agent may go to an emergency department 
or physician’s office for reliable answers. Situations such as an infectious disease 
outbreak, especially with high-profile diseases like Avian or Pandemic Influenza, 
have great potential to overwhelm our medical system and create major obstacles 
to efficiently treating those in need of care.14 Additionally, those who have not 
been exposed, but are worried about being ill may actually be exposed to the 
infectious agent if unnecessarily visiting physicians and emergency departments.  
Active Surveillance Capabilities 
Poison control centers have the potential, if linked with public health and trained 
to handle public health related issues, to efficiently receive and respond to 
requests for public health information and guidance. They also have the systems 
and capabilities to perform active surveillance and reporting and can be utilized 
to screen and refer callers to appropriate facilities for medical screening and/or 
treatment.15   
In response to the 2006 radiological dispersal incident, an event of public 
health significance, Britain utilized their nurse-led, telephone system, the 
National Health System Direct (NHS Direct), to quell the fears of thousands of 
citizens who were unaware of the health risks of radiological exposure, unfamiliar 
with Polonium-210, or unsure of how or if they could have been exposed to 
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Polonium-210.16 They also used this same telephone nurse system to screen 
potentially exposed individuals and refer those persons to appropriate centers for 
urine collection and analysis. NHS Direct was able to perform active surveillance 
during the incident. 
During the response to the intentional radiological dispersal incident, the 
Health Protection Agency, Britain’s equivalent of the United States’ Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, provided essential information both through the 
NHS Direct Internet site and the twenty-four-hour, nurse-staffed telephone help 
line. Within days of informing the public that Litvinenko died of an intentional 
radiological poisoning, NHS Direct received over 2,000 phone requests for 
information about exposure, side effects, and other concerns. In the next month, 
the number rose to a total of almost 4,000 calls about the incident.17  Imagine if 
these 4,000 callers had rushed to the nearest emergency department with their 
worries. The health system would not have been able to triage all of these 
thousands of people along with other unrelated emergency cases. The surge 
would have severely taxed the health care system and the laboratory network. 
The provision of personalized, adequate health information provided 
immeasurable benefits to the response efforts.  
NHS Direct also utilized a systematic approach to screen individuals for 
potential exposure based on the known information about the event and were 
subsequently able to refer this smaller group of nearly 800 people on for medical 
monitoring.18 The U.S. can utilize the poison control system in a manner similar 
to what was done in the Britain Litvinenko intentional dispersal event. Currently 
they are assisting in the response to the H1N1 outbreak. According to the 
National Poison Data System, between May 20th and August 13th, 2009, the U.S. 
poison control system fielded 392 calls from the public about H1N1.19 This is 
evidence that the U.S. public utilizes poison control centers as a resource for 
information about diverse health topics, not only poisonings.   
Existent Continuity of Operations Plans 
In addition to potentially reducing healthcare surge-capacity dilemmas and to 
providing active surveillance, poison control centers often have continuity of 
operations plans to ensure continuation of services in emergency or disaster 
situations. In order to receive federal funding, poison centers must meet the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers’ certification standards that 
include having mutual aid agreements for both local and national poison center 
partnerships for when call assistance is needed.  
For the most part, poison control centers have the autonomy to plan and train 
for emergencies and disasters as they deem appropriate. While exact statistics are 
unknown, many of the sixty poison centers are able to generate their own 
electricity to run computer systems and receive telephone calls should their 
region experience damaged infrastructure during a natural disaster or terrorist 
event. Additionally, some centers have plans for their nurses to telecommute if 
the disaster or event requires (and allows) it and, through a universal online 
information platform, they have the ability to receive immediate information 
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updates simultaneously across the sixty centers.20 While not all poison centers 
are currently able to access this platform online in real time, this resource is in 
development. In the meantime, email can be used to get consistent urgent 
response messages across all centers simultaneously. 
Handling Anxious and Fearful Callers 
Not only do poison control centers have the infrastructure and systems to receive 
calls and provide consistent, accurate information, they are also trained and 
experienced in communicating with anxious, worried callers. With appropriate 
situational information, poison control specialists can also field calls from 
worried and emotional callers during disasters and mass incidents. Certainly, 
these specialists can benefit from improved psychological first aid skills, but the 
foundation for this response exists. 
In the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada’s Telehealth system (another 
national, nurse-led telephone system) provided crucial support during an event 
that required strict social distancing measures and caused extreme and hyper-
vigilant fear among citizens. Prior to the outbreak, Telehealth fielded 
approximately 2,000 calls per day. During the event, nurses handled over 20,000 
calls per day.21 America’s existing poison control system has the infrastructure 
and the trained personnel to provide a similar response to calls for personalized, 
accurate and consistent risk communication during a disaster or emergency 
incident. While one regional center alone may not be able to handle all of the calls 
of a regional disaster such as the Toronto SARS outbreak, unanswered calls will 
roll to partner centers for additional support. It is also possible to forward calls to 
other centers as needed. In 2007, US poison control centers fielded over 4 million 
calls, averaging almost 12,000 calls per day as routine service.22 Some poison 
control centers are working to identify additional nurses to commit to training 
and assist as needed in an outbreak or other emergency or disaster-related event. 
In some cases, contingency plans include the assistance of retired nurses located 
through partnerships with state public health agencies. This is an example of one 
way poison centers and public health can plan and work together to increase 
preparedness and resiliency during a prolonged emergency or disaster.    
As a federalist nation founded on individual state autonomy, it is difficult to 
provide consistent messaging to the public in multiple states and regions when 
disasters and emergency incidents happen. The poison control system, as 
previously discussed, has the existing infrastructure to provide consistent 
messages to the poison control centers in all fifty states. With a universal access 
number, callers can easily reach their regional poison control center from 
anywhere in the U.S. If, for any reason, the regional phone lines are unavailable, 
the call will automatically roll to partner poison control centers. If there is a 
disaster affecting phone service in the region, poison centers will forward their 
calls to their national partners until the region regains service. They also have a 
language line for speaking with non-English speakers and telecommunication 
devices for the hearing or speech impaired.  
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An Example of a Successful Linkage 
The Georgia Poison Center has been collaborating with the state Department of 
Public Health for over a decade. They receive public health’s after-hours calls, 
provide guidance, and triage calls requiring direct connections to on-call public 
health officials. Georgia’s Department of Public Health contributes funding to the 
Georgia Poison Center to cover the cost of providing this service and for triaging 
all rabies calls.23 In addition to calls rolled from the Department of Public Health 
phone lines, the Georgia Poison Center has assisted callers during the 2004 fire 
that resulted in chemical releases around the city of Atlanta, and the closing of an 
area hospital and freeway. They field calls about unknown substances, such as 
during the white powder Anthrax incidents of 2001, and they handle food 
outbreak concerns and reports. Already, other poison control centers, as in 
Georgia, are working with public health to improve their response and recovery 
from incidents and outbreaks. It is essential to foster these and other 
relationships between poison centers, public health, and emergency response. In 
states where partnerships exist, the linkages necessary for improved all-hazards 
risk communication, response, and recovery will be developed with greater ease.  
Utilizing Existing Systems as Cost-Savings 
According to 1992 national data, the poison control system reduced annual 
medical spending by $355 million through cost avoidance by managing caller 
concerns and reducing the need for callers to attend emergency departments.24 
Similar cost savings may be possible for disaster and mass incident response and 
general assistance to public health departments. One possible challenge to 
developing these partnerships is that the increase in cost to the poison control 
centers must be supplemented with appropriate funding from federal or state 
governments or new partner organizations.   
Poison control centers continue to struggle to remain financially viable. They 
currently receive federal funding through the Poison Control Center 
Enhancement and Awareness Act but the appropriated amount can change 
depending on the federal budget. For most centers this federal funding does not 
provide enough support to cover their entire annual budget. Poison centers 
receive state funding as well, which means that year-to-year state budget cuts 
have the potential to have a negative impact on the future of some poison control 
centers. As a result of these funding inconsistencies, some poison control centers 
have utilized innovative mechanisms to ensure financial support. For example, in 
one state, all medical centers receiving assistance from poison centers provide 
supplemental funding to the state poison control system. Another state receives 
supplemental funding from tax structures such as long distance phone taxes. 
Useful partnerships between public health, emergency management, and 
homeland security have the potential to supplement the budgets of poison 
control systems while simultaneously providing benefits to the partner agencies 
and, perhaps most importantly, to the U.S. public in the form of improved 
homeland preparedness, response, and security.  








As we “strive to create a fully integrated national emergency response system that 
is adaptable to any terrorist attack, no matter how unlikely or catastrophic, as 
well as all manner of natural disasters,”25 it is natural that public health and 
emergency management partner with poison control centers and utilize the 
strong foundation present in the poison control infrastructure. Americans will 
expect forthcoming risk communication and it is necessary that we think through 
how we will field the many thousands of telephone calls, public inquires, and 
requests for guidance that may result for any number of hazards. Personalized 
information may be necessary to keep our other response and medical systems 
functioning efficiently; however, we need to ensure adequate and consistent 
messages. The poison control system can already do this, but we will need to 
overcome the potential barriers of obtaining buy-in for establishing partnerships 
among these agencies and increase funding for the already over-taxed poison 
control system so they expand their current training to include all-hazards 
preparedness and develop successful linkages with appropriate agencies.  
In response to the call for improved all hazards response, coordination and 
collaboration, it is vital that the department of homeland security, emergency 
management, public health, and the poison control system come to the table to 
begin these important discussions. Only then can we begin to address questions 
such as what is needed to promote consistent messaging, how many more people 
do we need to provide sufficient support for the call system in a national disaster 
or outbreak, and what are the weaknesses in our current telephone answering 
system and infrastructure? Until we have an evidence base that explains the 
opportunities that exist and the gaps we must fill to improve disaster and 
emergency response we are no further along toward improved security. 
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A Note from the Editors of Homeland Security Affairs: This essay was the winner of the 
2009 CHDS Essay Contest, which posed the question: What advice concerning 
Homeland Security would you give the next presidential administration and why? 
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Inaccurate Prediction of Nuclear Weapons Effects and 
Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism 
Preparedness 
Robert C. Harney 
The unthinkable is probably inevitable. At some time in the future a terrorist 
group will detonate a nuclear explosive in a major metropolitan area. Nuclear 
non-proliferation regimes are not working. The earliest U.S. policies failed to 
prevent the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, France, and China from developing 
nuclear weapons. Later policies failed to deter Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and 
India. They have not proven successful with North Korea or Iran and did not 
work in Iraq (unless you count invasion as an element of our non-proliferation 
policy). The few apparent successes (South Africa, Libya, etc.) can be attributed 
to internal factors as much as to the effects of non-proliferation activities. Once 
nuclear weapons are in the hands of unstable states or states that support 
terrorism, there is little doubt that one or more will ultimately wind up in the 
hands of non-state or state-supported terrorist organizations. Terrorist 
possession of a nuclear weapon will result in its use against a “highest-value” 
target – most likely a large city with major economic value, cultural and/or 
religious significance, and a dense population in which high casualties will result. 
 The likelihood of an attack has prompted considerable public debate about 
what are the best steps to prevent such an attack. In many of these discussions 
estimates of the number of casualties or the size of the area that would be 
damaged by an attack are used to reinforce the importance of action.1 Ironically, 
as discussed later, these estimates may evoke inaction in some critical areas. 
Paraphrasing many examples, they typically state: a Hiroshima-sized weapon 
detonated in a major metropolitan area will kill a million people or will vaporize 
everything within a half-mile of ground zero or some other equally dramatic 
claim (although some scenarios are less cataclysmic). To this author, the 
estimates do not ring true – they sound excessive. The estimates are often quoted 
or repeated by individuals who clearly lack technical expertise in nuclear 
weapons effects and original sources for the estimates are seldom cited. Although 
it is possible that some are the product of hyperbole used in political oratory to 
reinforce a point, the frequency is too high for this to always be the case. It is 
more likely that valid estimates made for a military attack scenario have been 
improperly extrapolated to the terrorist scenario. However, if the policymakers 
making such statements actually believe these estimates, then inaccurate 
information is being used to set policy, and something should be done to rectify 
the situation. Such “excessive” estimates have been used to establish emergency 
response planning guidance.2 It remains to be seen whether this will result in 
over-preparation or under-preparation. Neither is desirable. The primary 
purpose of this paper is to discuss the accuracy of common effects estimates and 
describe how more realistic estimates might affect nuclear terrorism 
preparedness. 
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STANDARD EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
The standard weapons effects prediction process occurs as follows. The desired 
type of nuclear explosive, its yield, and its height of burst are selected. The 
distances at which specific effects levels are expected to be achieved are estimated 
using relations derived from comparison of theory to measurements obtained 
during nuclear testing. Using these distances, areas are calculated that are 
associated with each effects level. The effects levels are then correlated with 
percentages of casualties. This correlation is somewhat subjective, but in the best 
cases is based on modeling that has been validated by the results from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Once a target has been selected, population density data, the 
calculated effects areas, and the casualty correlations are multiplied to estimate 
the total numbers of casualties expected. 
For purposes of example, we will assume that a Hiroshima-sized fission 
weapon (nominal 10 kT) is the most probable terrorist weapon. Slightly smaller 
or larger yields will not dramatically alter the results. Doubling the yield results 
in 22% larger blast damage distances and less than 49% larger areas (or 
casualties). Manhattan (New York City) is assumed to be the hypothetical target 
as it is arguably the highest probability target in the United States. It has the 
highest workday population density, it is the economic capital of the country, and 
it is a symbol of freedom and American might and prosperity. 
The “standard” analysis is an outgrowth of military effects analysis. Most 
experienced weapons-effects predictors learned their skills while addressing 
either global thermonuclear war or the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, virtually all examples used to guide novice or inexperienced effects 
predictors will be based on military analyses. With the exception of nuclear 
attacks on missile silos, deeply buried command centers, naval targets, and 
similar targets, an optimum altitude airburst is assumed in military nuclear-
effects analyses. The optimum altitude airburst is far and away the most common 
analytical assumption in nuclear effects analysis. As we shall see, this may be the 
source of the putative overestimates. 
The range at which each effect level occurs can be estimated from simple 
relations that scale with the nuclear explosive yield W (in kilotons, abbreviated 
kT). Scaling relations allow the experimentally verified ranges at which specific 
effects are produced for a reference explosion of known yield (typically 1 kT) to be 
extrapolated to the ranges at which those same effects would be produced by an 
explosion with a different yield. Hundreds of atmospheric nuclear tests at Nevada 
Test Site, Enewetak Atoll, and elsewhere have contributed to the verification of 
these scaling relations. The scaling relation for the distance (in meters) at which a 
specific overpressure (i.e., the pressure in excess of atmospheric pressure) is 
produced by air blast from the explosion is given by3 
  RXpsi (W) = RXpsi (1kT) W1/3       
where the scaling distance RXpsi(1 kT) for a 1 kT optimum altitude airburst can be 
shown to be  
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  = 2125 meters for 1 psi overpressure 
  = 1290 meters for 2 psi overpressure 
  = 700 meters for 5 psi overpressure 
  = 405 meters for 12 psi overpressure. 
These four overpressure levels are those used in the Office of Technology 
Assessment casualty correlation described later.4 The relation for distance (in 
meters) at which different levels of thermal radiation is produced by the 
explosion is given by 
 R2cal/cm2 (W) = 1180 W1/2 
 R8cal/cm2 (W) = 590 W1/2         
 R20cal/cm2 (W) = 375 W1/2  
The thermal radiation ranges are strongly dependent on atmospheric 
transmission. The values shown assume a perfectly clear day (no atmospheric 
attenuation). Ranges for hazy days will be shorter; the hazier the day, the shorter 
the thermal range. The relation for the distance (in meters) at which specific 
doses of direct nuclear radiation can occur is given by 
 R70rad (W) = 1200 + 500 logW       
 R300rad (W) = 950 + 500 logW       
 R800rad (W) = 800 + 500 logW    
Given a 10 kT airburst at the optimum altitude, the blast effects distances and 
their associated levels of damage are seen to be: 
 12 psi = 870 m for severe damage (steel-reinforced structures damaged) 
 5 psi = 1510m for moderate damage (wood/masonry structures 
destroyed) 
 2 psi = 2780 m for minor damage (wood/masonry structures damaged) 
 1 psi = 4580 m for light damage (windows shattered). 
The thermal effects distance from ground zero is: 
 2 cal/cm2 = 3730 m for first-degree skin burns (equivalent to a sunburn). 
 8 cal/cm2 = 1865 m for severe skin burns & ignition of easily flammable 
materials. 
 20 cal/cm2 = 1180 m for ignition of most flammable materials. 
The distance associated with direct nuclear radiation effects (assuming no 
shielding) is:  
 70 rads = 1700 m for the threshold of radiation sickness (mild 
symptoms). 
 300 rads = 1450 m for the radiation sickness lethal threshold (approx. 
5% fatalities). 
 800 rads = 1300 m for 100% fatal radiation sickness. 
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The next step in the analysis is to correlate casualties with weapons-effects levels. 
Although nuclear radiation and thermal radiation produce casualties, 
overpressure appears to be the best single predictor of casualty levels.5 The 
correlation used by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and summarized 
in Table I is often used. 
 
Table I.  Correlation of casualty levels with overpressure. 
 
 Peak Overpressure          Fraction of Population Density 
  (psi)       Dead             Injured           Uninjured 
   >12       0.98      0.02        --- 
   5-12       0.50      0.40      0.10 
   2-5       0.05      0.45      0.50 
   1-2         ---       0.25      0.75 
   <1         ---         ---       1.00 
 
Consider now a 10 kT airburst in Manhattan. The average daytime population 
density in the Central Business District (Manhattan south of 60th Street) is 
83,000 per square kilometer.6 The maximum local daytime population density 
occurs in the half-mile (0.8km) area around Grand Central Terminal7 and is 
approximately 330,000 per km2. Circular damage areas are calculated using the 
overpressure distances above. The areas are multiplied by the appropriate 
population densities and by the OTA correlation fractions to determine 
casualties. Details are summarized in Table II. Roughly 66 km2 are damaged, 
over six million people are directly affected, and total casualties are estimated to 
be in excess of 2,700,000. The areas and the casualty estimates determined in 
this fashion are consistent with those mentioned in the public debates. The injury 
estimates may be too high as the 1-2 psi area includes large portions of the 
surrounding rivers. 
 
Table II.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton airburst over Manhattan. 
 
         DAMAGE          POPULATION    ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII   AREA    DENS.     TOTAL   CASUALTIES 
(psi)  (km)   (km
2
)   (km
-2
)            ---   DEATHS    INJURIES 
>12  < 0.87    2.38  330,000      785,400    769,692            15,708 
5-12  0.87 - 1.51   4.78    83,000      396,740    198,370          158,696 
2-5  1.51 - 2.78 17.12    83,000   1,420,960      71,048          639,432 
1-2  2.78 - 4.58 41.62    83,000   3,454,460               0          863,615 
TOTALS 4.58  65.90  ---     6,057,560 1,039,110       1,677,451 
 
This traditional casualty analysis coupled with observations of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki presents a nearly “hopeless” picture. That is, one would expect that the 
southernmost one-quarter of Manhattan would be devastated. Roads through 
damaged areas would be impassable. Evacuation to mitigate fallout effects would 
probably be impractical in some areas. Power, water, communications, 
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transportation, and sanitation disruptions would extend well beyond the 
damaged areas. The expected number of injuries would exceed the number of 
hospital beds in the entire nation (approximately 945,000 in 2007),8 despite the 
fact that many of the casualties in the 1-2 psi area would not require 
hospitalization. A significant fraction of the first responders would be among the 
casualties. Many of the “injuries” might become “fatalities” due to inadequate 
medical care, shortages of food, and lack of shelter. The expected economic 
damage is severe, almost beyond comprehension. Economic repercussions would 
continue for years. 
If we assume the traditional analysis is what will always result, then a weak 
U.S. government might consider giving in to terrorist demands (if voiced ahead of 
time), rather than suffer the effects of such an attack. Since permitting such a 
catastrophic attack would be utterly unacceptable, actions likely to be taken to 
prevent anticipated attacks might further erode Constitutional rights. As the 
aftermath of such an attack is “hopeless,” planning for emergency response would 
probably be inadequately funded. Why prepare for something that is beyond 
accommodation, especially when there are always competing priorities for using 
available funds? Furthermore, since the Cold War has conditioned the public to 
view nuclear attack as the end of the world and the “hopeless” scenario does 
nothing to contradict this view, little or no personal preparation will be made for 
self-preservation and survival. Inadequate planning and preparation at all levels 
would greatly magnify the effects of an attack when it comes. This must be 
avoided. 
NONTRADITIONAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS     
At this point it is worth injecting an additional dose of reality. That is, the 
heuristics for predicting airburst casualties presented in the preceding section 
(and used by the most vocal predictors) are applicable only to optimum altitude 
airbursts. Thus, the damage and casualty analysis is realistic only for an optimum 
altitude airburst. Although the underlying theory is valid for other types of bursts, 
the numbers are not. There are fundamental differences between an airburst and 
a surface burst (Figure 1). Airbursts affect every structure separately; surface 
bursts affect structures sequentially. Airburst blast waves reflect off the surface, 
increasing the damaging overpressure; surface bursts do not produce such 
reflections. The optimum altitude also scales as W1/3, and for a 10 kT device is 
670 meters (twice as tall as the highest buildings) if optimized for 5 psi 
overpressure. Thus, detonation at the top of a tall building will not produce the 
optimum airburst effects, although the effects produced will be larger than those 
for a surface burst. Only an aircraft-delivered bomb, cruise missile, or ballistic 
missile can produce an optimum altitude airburst. For a variety of reasons, we 
anticipate that terrorist attacks are more likely to use a surface burst than an 
airburst. 
Terrorists are not state-operated military forces. A terrorist bomb is unlikely to 
be mounted on a missile. It is unlikely to be man-portable. It is likely to be large 
and heavy. Delivery by aircraft will probably require a multi-engine aircraft, 
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although aircraft of sufficient size are readily available in the general aviation 
community. If a policy of no overflight of downtown areas is established (or 
reestablished) and enforced, then an airburst can be made extremely difficult, if 
not prevented. Transport to the top floors of the tallest skyscrapers is difficult and 
likely to be detected. A policy of requiring access control and surveillance of 
elevators in all buildings taller than average, can further reduce this possibility. 
Given the severity of the threat and the utility of both aircraft overflight and tall 
buildings in potential delivery of chemical or biological weapons, consistent and 
effective controls of both should be implemented. Even if the bomb could be 
detonated on a tall building, the effects would be closer to surface burst levels 
than to airburst levels. Transport by truck, however, is relatively easy and difficult 
to prevent. Thus, it is more likely for a terrorist weapon to be detonated at street 
level than at the optimum airburst height. 
 
Figure 1.  Fundamental difference between an airburst over a downtown 




Airburst – Buildings provide little mutual shielding from blast.  Surface reflection 
enhances the overpressure. 
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Surface burst – Buildings provide significant mutual shielding from blast. Lack of surface 
reflection reduces overpressure. 
 
The same theory used to produce heuristics for airbursts can produce surface-
burst heuristics. These have also been validated by experiments at Nevada Test 
Site and elsewhere.9 These surface-burst values are valid for flat surfaces without 
significant obstructions (such as the dry lakes where nuclear tests were 
conducted). Surface bursts do not have overpressure enhancement caused by 
reflections. Thus, the blast damage ranges for flat-surface bursts are considerably 
smaller than for optimum airbursts. These heuristics are almost certainly 
overestimates for built-up areas (high-rise downtowns or even suburban 
environments). Nagasaki proved that hills cast “shadows” that significantly 
reduce nuclear radiation, thermal radiation, and blast effects. Casualties at 
Nagasaki were one-half those at Hiroshima where no hills interfered with the 
explosion. The presence of multiple massive structures one behind another 
should cast similar shadows that must reduce predicted damage ranges. 
Nevertheless, before we consider the effects of buildings, it is instructive to 
analyze the flat-surface burst scenario as a worst case that is much more realistic 
than the airburst scenario. 
Figure 2 shows the relation of burst height vs. range for different 
overpressures. The obviously larger ranges for airbursts are due to the fact that 
airburst shock waves are enhanced by reflections off the ground. Surface bursts 
over flat terrain are not similarly enhanced. Surface bursts over flat terrain will 
damage objects at considerably shorter distances than airbursts (e.g., 3800 feet 
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Figure 2.  The relationship between height of burst, distance from ground zero, 





      
Scaling relations for effects levels can be obtained for surface bursts. These 
relations have also been validated by atmospheric tests. The scaling distances 
RXpsi(1 kT) are: 
  = 1170 meters for 1 psi overpressure 
  = 715 meters for 2 psi overpressure 
  = 450 meters for 5 psi overpressure 
  = 275 meters for 12 psi overpressure 
Given a 10 kT burst at a flat surface, the blast effects distances are seen to be: 
12 psi = 590 m for severe damage (steel-reinforced structures damaged) 
5 psi = 970 m for moderate damage (wood/masonry structures destroyed) 
2 psi = 1540 m for minor damage (wood/masonry structures damaged) 
1 psi = 2520 m for light damage (windows shattered). 
Blast damage distances are considerably smaller for the flat-surface burst than 
for the airburst. The relation for distance (in meters) at which different levels of 
thermal radiation is produced by the surface burst is given by 
Surface Burst Airburst 
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  R2cal/cm2 (W) = 845 W1/2 
  R8cal/cm2 (W) = 425 W1/2         
  R20cal/cm2 (W) = 270 W1/2  
The thermal radiation ranges are strongly dependent on atmospheric 
transmission. The values shown assume an extremely clear day (no atmospheric 
attenuation). Ranges for hazy days will be shorter. The relation for the distance 
(in meters) at which specific doses of direct nuclear radiation can occur is given 
by 
  R70rad (W) = 1200 + 500 logW       
  R300rad (W) = 950 + 500 logW       
  R800rad (W) = 800 + 500 logW  
The thermal effects distance from ground zero is: 
2 cal/cm2 = 2675 m for first-degree skin burns (equivalent to a sunburn). 
8 cal/cm2 = 1335 m for severe skin burns & ignition of easily flammable materials. 
20 cal/cm2 = 845 m for ignition of most flammable materials. 
The distance associated with direct nuclear radiation effects is:  
70 rads = 1700 m for the threshold of radiation sickness (mild symptoms). 
300 rads = 1450 m for the radiation sickness lethal threshold (appx. 5% fatalities). 
800 rads = 1300 m for 100% fatal radiation sickness. 
 
Using the same analysis technique as for the airburst, flat surface burst casualty 
estimates were produced and are summarized in Table III. Fatalities are 
estimated at 510,640 compared to 1,039,110, and total casualties are estimated at 
1,022,159 compared to 2,716,561. The reduction is significant (more than a factor 
of 2). However, the flat-surface burst ignores the fact that large structures 
attenuate blast effects.  
 
 
Table III.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton flat-surface burst in Manhattan 
(without structures). 
 
          DAMAGE     POPULATION        ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII   AREA   DENS.       TOTAL        CASUALTIES 




)            ---   DEATHS    INJURIES 
>12  < 0.59    1.09  330,000       359,700   352,506           7,194 
5-12  0.59 – 0.97   1.86  150,000       279,000   139,500       111,600 
2-5  0.97 – 1.54   4.49    83,000       372,670     18,634       133,350 
1-2  1.54 – 2.52 12.50    83,000    1,037,500              0       259,375 
TOTALS 2.52  19.95       ---      2,048,870    510,640       511,519 
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NONTRADITIONAL ANALYSIS CONSIDERING STRUCTURES 
Standardized and validated models for dealing with street-level explosions in 
built-up areas are not available. However, first-order models can yield 
considerable insight. The first model assumes that an explosion in the “canyons” 
of a city can be treated as a shallow buried explosion in rock that has a density 
equivalent to that of the average density of buildings, their contents, and the 
spaces in between. The buildings are the equivalent of the overlying rock. A 
nuclear explosion beneath but near the surface of the ground will produce a 
crater. Extensive test data exists for crater-forming explosions. The radius of a 
crater Ra in normal rock (e.g., granite, a standard material encountered in 
underground nuclear explosions) produced by an underground burst at the depth 
for producing maximum crater size is given by 
  Ra = 46W
0.3
 = 92 m (for 10 kT)       
The radius of the continuous ejecta layer surrounding the crater is given by 
  Re = 2.15Ra = 198 m         
Crater dimensions will scale as the inverse cube root of the material density. The 
density (mass per unit volume) of a “city” is estimated to be 0.1-0.03 times the 
density of granite. The air between the various thicknesses of steel, wood, paper, 
and concrete produces the lower density. For this range of densities, the scaled 
radii are 2.15 to 3.22 larger than for granite. Thus, the scaled radii for a “city” are: 
 - Crater Ra = 200-300 m 
 - Ejecta Re = 425-640 m 
 
Buildings inside the crater radius will be shattered and toppled. Buildings inside 
the ejecta radius will be damaged and possibly destroyed by impact of flying 
debris. Buildings outside the ejecta radius will receive little serious damage. 
A second model makes use of the fact that a blast wave cannot pass through a 
surface it cannot destroy. This is why a sturdy wall can protect one from a small 
conventional explosion on the other side of the wall. A wood frame wall can 
withstand overpressures of 1-2 psi. A masonry wall can withstand overpressures 
of 3-10 psi. A steel reinforced concrete wall can withstand overpressures of 7-15 
psi. In the steel-and-concrete jungle of a downtown area, it is a virtual certainty 
that a steel reinforced concrete wall will be encountered every 100 m or so. Thus, 
as soon as the blast overpressure has dropped below 7 psi, blast effects will be no 
longer be important. For the flat-surface burst the 7-psi level occurs at about 400 
m radius. Inside this radius this second model predicts damage will be severe; 
outside it will be light. 
A third approach assumes blast wave propagation through buildings is 
equivalent to blast wave propagation through a layered medium producing many 
small reflections that add up to a significant attenuation. That is, each external 
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wall, internal wall, room partition, or large object (bookcase, file cabinet, desk, 
credenza, etc.) in a building will reflect a tiny fraction of the blast wave. This is 
analogous to a light wave passing through a window. Most of the light passes 
through the window, but a small fraction is reflected. In the remainder of this 
analysis, all such substantial objects will be considered “walls.” After passing 
through one “wall” with reflectivity r, the overpressure is reduced by 
  !p = !p0(1-r)          
After passing through N “walls” with reflectivity r, the overpressure is reduced by 
  !p = !p0(1-r)
N
 " !p0(R) exp[-rR/RW]       
with  
  N = R/RW           
where RW is the average spacing between “walls.” The average spacing between 
reflecting surfaces may be assumed to be 3-6 m (10-20 ft). The reflectivity of a 
“wall” will depend on the strength of the “wall” and the overpressure incident 
upon it. If the overpressure cannot overcome the strength then the reflectivity 
will be close to 1. For very weak walls the reflectivity might be 0.001 or less. Since 
the reflectivity coefficient cannot be easily determined, we assume the average 
reflectivity is 0.005-0.02. Without substantiating experimental evidence, these 
assumed values for reflectivity may be suspect. However, assuming a relatively 
low value for this factor is likely to result in an underestimate of the attenuation 
effects of reflections, the occurrence of which is a virtual certainty. Table IV gives 
the overpressure vs. radius for several choices of wall spacing and reflectance per 
wall.   
 
Table IV.   Blast overpressure attenuation by multiple reflections. 
 
     NO         r = 0.005  0.01             0.02             0.01 
RANGE           WALLS         RW = 3m  3m  3m  6m 
(m)                 (psi)             (psi)             (psi)             (psi)  (psi) 
380     30  15.9  8.4  2.3  15.9 
470     20   9.1  4.1  0.8    9.1 
590     12   4.5  1.7  0.2    4.5 
660     10   3.3  1.1  0.1    3.3 
970       5   1.0  0.2  0.007    1.0 
 
All choices result in: 
 Severe damage radii (12 psi) ! 420 meters 
 Moderate damage radii (5 psi) < 600 meters 
 Minor damage radii (2 psi) < 800 meters 
 Light damage radii (1 psi) < 1000 meters. 
 
The three unrelated models produce surprisingly similar results. Although this is 
not conclusive, it suggests that the results are reasonable approximations of 
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reality. Upon comparing the results of all three models it is reasonable to assume 
the following values: 
 Severe damage range is 400 m and produces 98% fatality rate and 2% 
injury rate 
 Moderate damage range is 500 m and produces 50% fatality rate and 
40% injury rate 
 Minor damage range is 600 m and produces 5% fatality rate and 45% 
injury rate 
 Light damage range is 1000 m and produces 0% fatality rate and 25% 
injury rate. 
A casualty analysis was performed using the ranges estimated for a building-
modified surface burst. Figures are summarized in Table V. Fatalities are 
estimated to be 213,675 with total casualties of 381,285. About 1 km2 will be 
significantly damaged. Note: street effects will increase these estimates slightly.   
 
Table V.  Casualty analysis for a 10-kiloton surface burst in Manhattan (with structures). 
 
            DAMAGE                 POPULATION              ASSOCIATED  
ZONE  RADII       AREA   DENS.      TOTAL    CASUALTIES 
---  (km)  (km2)  (km-2)          ---           DEATHS     INJURIES 
Heavy  < 0.40  0.50  330,000    165,000     161,700            3,300 
Moderate 0.40 – 0.50 0.28  330,000      92,400  46,200          36,960 
Minor  0.50 – 0.60 0.35  330,000    115,500     5,775          51,975 
Light  0.60 – 1.00 2.01  150,000    301,500            0          75,375 
TOTALS 1.00  3.14  ---      674,400 213,675        167,610 
 
 It is worth commenting that the OTA correlation of overpressure with casualties 
was based on airbursts over cities with limited high-rise construction. Given the 
nature of the elastic response of large structures (whipping motion) and the 
possibility of large overpressures occurring locally due to addition of many small, 
reflected contributions, the casualty correlations in modern urban settings are 
suspect. It is possible that casualty rates in the moderate damage and minor 
damage zones (nominally 2-12 psi overpressure) could be enhanced. This is 
another topic worthy of additional quantitative analysis and modeling. However, 
even if all of the population in the heavy, moderate, and minor damage zones 
were killed, the deaths would be a fraction of those predicted for the flat-surface 
burst (372,900 vs. 510,640). If that same pessimistic modified correlation (100% 
deaths for overpressure greater than 2 psi) were applied to the airburst and flat 
surface burst scenarios, their fatality levels would more than double (although 
injuries would be significantly reduced). Note: absent modeling yet to be done, 
there is no justification to assume the validity of this most pessimistic correlation. 
The three effects that are the dominant contributors to the devastation of a 
nuclear explosion are blast (addressed above), nuclear radiation, and thermal 
radiation. Since this analysis has concentrated on blast effects, some discussion 
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of the other contributors is in order. Most nuclear radiation will be emitted 
before the fireball expands appreciably. Buildings provide significant shielding to 
nuclear radiation. As little as 22 cm (9 inches) of steel or 82 cm (33 inches) of 
concrete will stop more than 99% of the direct nuclear radiation. Nuclear 
radiation is not expected to penetrate beyond the first ring of buildings (roughly 
100 m radius). The short range at which the nuclear radiation remains significant 
implies that nuclear radiation will not be a significant contributor to immediate 
casualties compared to the blast effects. Note: nuclear radiation is assumed to be 
a contributor to airburst casualties. 
Thermal radiation is emitted from the fireball (whose maximum size is roughly 
the crater size in solid rock). It is a dominant contributor to airburst casualties 
and may even produce a firestorm. However, buildings provide significant 
shielding to thermal radiation. Only glass permits penetration beyond the first 
surface (and then only of the visible/near infrared component of the thermal 
radiation). As a result, thermal radiation is not expected to penetrate beyond the 
first ring of buildings outside the fireball (roughly 300 m radius). The short range 
to which significant thermal radiation can penetrate implies that thermal 
radiation will not be a significant contributor to casualties compared to the blast 
effects. Thermal radiation may start fires among the debris and produce a 
firestorm, although this is seriously debated.11 Regardless, such firestorms will be 
confined to the areas of heavy damage in which we have already assumed the 
maximum fatality rates. Whether or not a firestorm occurs it will not significantly 
affect either the damage or the number of casualties produced by a surface burst 
affected by structures. This is not true in airbursts. A firestorm produced much of 
the damage and many of the casualties at Hiroshima. The area affected by the 
firestorm was almost identical to the area in which significant blast damage 
occurred.12 
Fallout is a serious concern and could conceivably produce more casualties 
than blast, thermal, and initial radiation combined. Its effects are not included in 
the OTA correlation and do not appear in the analyses presented above, for the 
reason that they can be reduced to low numbers by timely evacuation of the 
fallout zone. Fallout production will not be strongly affected by the presence of 
structures. The fallout will spread downwind in an oval pattern from ground zero. 
For a 10 kT surface burst and 15 mph wind speed, the unit time (1 hour) dose rate 
contours are ellipses given in Table VI.13 Most people within the 1 rad/hr contour 
would receive a total dose (integrated over months) in excess of 5 rem if they 
were not continuously sheltered and did not evacuate. Workers in nuclear 
occupations are allowed to receive up to 5 rem in one year, and higher doses in 
emergencies. Thus, the 1 rad/hr contour represents the minimum area that would 
need to be evacuated. Since the permissible exposure limit for the general public 
is only 0.1 rem in one year, regulations might require much larger areas to be 
evacuated. However, in a disaster of the magnitude considered here, it might be 
necessary to decide that a level considered acceptable for radiation workers is 
also acceptable for the general public. It should be noted that any amount of 
sheltering reduces the exposure levels considerably and should be considered in 
disaster planning. The primary effect of low-level radiation exposure is the 
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production of cancers. The excess risk of dying from cancer over a lifetime is 
estimated to be 0.08% per rem for acute exposures.14 An individual exposed to 5 
rem has an additional 0.4% chance of dying of cancer typically 20-30 years after 
exposure. This is statistically significant but small compared to the normal 18% 
chance of dying from cancer. 
 
Table VI.  Fallout analysis. 
 
DOSE       CONTOUR 
RATE         LENGTH          WIDTH            EFFECT AND 
(rad/hr) (km)   (km)  EXPOSURE DURATION  
1000  8.17  0.334     Median lethal dose in minutes 
300   20.4   0.96     Median lethal dose in a few hours 
100  40.3  2.43     Median lethal dose in a few days 
30  72.7  4.43     Acute radiation syndrome in a few days (<120 rem) 
10  109   7.6     Acute radiation syndrome unlikely (<50 rem) 
1   182   16      No acute symptoms; increased cancer risk (<5 rem) 
 
A surface nuclear explosion will also produce source-region electromagnetic 
pulse (SREMP). As with blast effects, models of SREMP generation by surface 
explosions in densely populated areas are not available. However, the source 
region for SREMP generation is the radiation deposition region. For a flat-surface 
explosion of 10 kT yield, the deposition region has a radius of about 1 km. The 
field strength falls off quickly with increasing distance from the source region. 
Significant SREMP field strengths extend to distances of several kilometers.15 
Megaton yields are required to produce significant SREMP at ranges of 8-10 km. 
The area affected by the SREMP will scale as the size of the source region. We 
have already seen that for the 10 kT explosion in a downtown area, this will be 
limited to a radius of 100-200 m due to the surrounding buildings. Thus, the 
reduction in size of the source region is expected to reduce the distance at which 
significant field strengths are encountered to less than 1 km. It is nevertheless 
possible that SREMP may be strong enough to damage highly susceptible 
components (computers are among the electronic items most susceptible to 
damage) at distances out to several kilometers, but this is not a certainty. Much of 
the energy in SREMP is radiated at frequencies less than 100 MHz. At lower 
frequencies, the steel frames and steel reinforcing of most buildings will provide a 
shielding effect with some reduction of SREMP field strength at any electronic 
devices contained within. This is why cell phone and television reception using 
in-unit antennas is often poor in modern buildings. SREMP (and blast damage) 
effects on electrical power lines are likely to cause a local blackout, but new grid 
control systems (installed to prevent repeats of the great blackouts of recent 
memory) should prevent cascading failures, and power should be quickly 
restored to most areas. Integrated damage from SREMP will be negligible 
compared to that from blast. Contrary to common belief, SREMP will not destroy 
electronics throughout the whole city.  
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If the nuclear explosive is detonated on a street (as opposed to inside a parking 
structure), then a line of sight will exist to the fireball for great distances along 
that street (or streets, if at an intersection) on which the detonation occurs. 
Because of funneling and waveguide effects, both blast and thermal radiation 
effects may extend along the streets to distances larger than the normal surface 
burst distances. Lack of shielding will expose objects on streets to the same levels 
of nuclear radiation expected in airbursts. The highest levels of damage will be to 
vehicles and pedestrians. Because dynamic pressure (blast wind) acts 
predominantly in the direction of shock wave propagation, only static 
overpressure can cause appreciable damage to the walls and windows of 
buildings fronting on the streets. Shock waves reflected at grazing incidence 
produce less than half of the overpressure produced by head-on reflections. The 
damage to the facing walls of these building will be much less than that 
experienced by those buildings directly impacted by the shock. Damage and 
casualties along streets should be minor compared to the damage near ground 
zero, but will not be negligible.  
The shock wave propagating outward from ground zero will diffract around the 
edges of buildings. However, the diffracted shock wave will be significantly 
attenuated. Once the shock wave has turned the corner, it will act like the earlier 
shock wave along the first street, but with much less strength. Diffraction effects 
should result in significantly reduced overpressure in the shadows of large 
buildings. Diffraction effects will cause limited damage to the front corners of 
buildings at cross streets. It is likely that damage along cross streets will be 
determined more by whether or not the shadowing building is destroyed than by 
the diffracted shock. Damage and casualties along cross streets outside the direct 
blast damage radius should be negligible.  
 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table VI compares the results from the three analyses: airburst, flat-surface 
burst, and modified-surface burst. The differences in damaged areas and 
casualties are striking. 
 
Table VI.  Comparison of predicted airburst, flat surface, and modified 
surface burst effects. 
          FLAT       MODIFIED 
  EFFECT       AIR           SURFACE    SURFACE 
 Heavy damage    2.38 km
2





 Moderate damage    4.78 km
2





 Minor damage   17.12 km
2











   
 Fatalities              1,039,110    510,640 213,675 
 Injuries           1,677,451    511,519 167,610 
 Total Casualties      2,716,561 1,022,159 381,285 
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Contrary to the predictions of traditional analysis and experience of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, the more “realistic” analysis presents a picture that is much less 
dire. Fatalities are 20% of those predicted by the standard analysis, while injuries 
are 10% of those predicted and the damaged area is 5%. Much of the 
infrastructure will survive. Most evacuation routes will remain viable (permitting 
relocation for fallout mitigation). Food, water, sanitation, power, 
communications, and transportation will remain available to most of the city. 
Transportation to or from the rest of the country, especially air travel, is likely to 
be minimally affected. Airports are seldom located in the high population density 
areas that are attractive for casualty production. The first response system will 
remain intact. At most one or two police precincts and fire stations will be within 
damage zones. Only a small fraction of first responders will be among the 
casualties. 
The majority of the health care system will remain intact. Few hospitals, 
clinics, or potential shelter areas may be located within the small damage zones 
and thus will remain intact and operational. Few health care professionals will 
become casualties. Regional health care facilities (an estimated 60,000-70,000 
beds at three beds/1000 people) have the theoretical capacity to handle the most 
badly injured. However, most of the 60,000-70,000 beds are occupied during 
ordinary times and emergency rooms are almost always crowded. Diagnostics 
and elective procedures account for at least part of the occupation of beds and 
many emergency room visits occur in lieu of seeing primary care physicians. In a 
major emergency, many could be discharged by applying triage to those already 
at the facilities as well as to the victims of the explosion. Nevertheless, emergency 
treatment facilities will be stressed. This should be considered during planning 
for disaster preparedness, as well as in any discussions of generally improving 
national health care.  
Although horrific and highly stressing of existing resources, this scenario is 
nearly ideal for disaster response and relief by local, state, and national entities. 
Because structures and roads will be undamaged outside the immediate blast 
area, the effects of fallout from a single nuclear event can be minimized through 
immediate and effective response including fallout prediction and a combination 
of evacuation, sheltering in place and/or decontamination. Sheltering for as little 
as one day can reduce the fallout exposure to less than 20% of the maximum 
possible accumulated exposure at any location, even if the individual then elects 
to remain in the contaminated area. It can reduce the total exposure to less than 
1% of the maximum possible if the individual elects to walk out of the fallout zone 
(estimated to take a few hours at most). There is a place for renewed interest in 
civil defense. 
Such civil defense must have a personal emphasis, not just a governmental 
emphasis. An unprepared population will suffer needlessly in any disaster, 
manmade or natural. In general, those people most likely to survive are those 
who are prepared to survive and who will not wait passively for the government 
to save them. Government has been willing to educate people what to do to 
prepare for earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados, although it could be more 
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aggressive in this education. It should do the same for terrorist attacks, especially 
in likely target areas.  
It is also important to realize that for any metropolitan area other than 
downtown Manhattan, the casualty estimates would be a small fraction of those 
calculated here. Hiroshima and Nagasaki both had downtown population 
densities of 10,000 per km2. Initial U.S./Japanese casualty estimates for 
Hiroshima were 68,000 killed and 76,000 injured and for Nagasaki were 38,100 
killed and 21,000 injured.16 Later Japanese estimates of casualties at Hiroshima 
are 114,000 killed and 78,000 injured.17 As there are reasons for the first set of 
estimates to be biased low and the later set to be biased high, some intermediate 
value is probably closer to the truth. Deaths occurring more than six months after 
the explosions (e.g., due to cancers) are not included. None of these estimates 
includes any military personnel or Korean “guest workers” that may have been in 
the cities and would have raised the numbers above those shown here.   
For comparison, the 1980 OTA estimate18 of the workday population density in 
downtown Detroit was 8600 per km2. If the modified surface burst casualty 
analysis of Table V were repeated for a population density of 10,000 per km2, 
then fewer than 6500 deaths and 7850 injuries would be predicted. Placed in 
perspective, these figures are comparable to the roughly 6650 people that die of 
all causes on any average day in the United States19 and only twice the roughly 
3000 dead and 6000+ injured in the 9/11 attacks. The United States has survived 
such disasters before and will again. Even if an airburst could be produced the 
estimated casualty levels would be 56,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries (and this 
is an overestimate because the 10,000 per km2 peak density is unlikely to extend 
over the entire 40+ km2 damage area of an airburst). Hiroshima had an average 
population density in the damage area of about 3300 per km2 while Nagasaki had 
an average population density of only 2300 per km2. An airburst in a city other 
than Manhattan is likely to be comparable to Hiroshima or Nagasaki.   
Some critics might contend that an airburst is the likely form of attack and 
surface explosions are irrelevant. However, it is many orders of magnitude easier 
to secure the airspace over a few large cities (and thus deter attempts at 
producing airbursts) than it is to secure the surface areas of those cities. All the 
former requires is the government’s will to enforce “zero overflight” zones with 
deadly force. Such enforcement should be established. Similarly, uniform and 
effective security measures for controlling access to the tallest buildings are 
practical and should also be established. Securing the surface against terrorist 
attack is probably not possible except in a few specific locations at a few specific 
times, such as special events.  
The promulgation of unrealistic estimates does the government and the 
general population a great disservice. People should not be persuaded to believe 
that a terrorist-initiated nuclear attack is the end of the world. We will probably 
experience such an attack at some point in the future and the world will not end. 
Millions will not be killed by a single event, although tens of thousands may. We 
will be forced to deal with the consequences. People tend to rise to the challenge 
in adverse situations, but they give up in situations perceived as hopeless. 
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Terrorist attacks, no matter how devastating, should not be made to appear 
hopeless. 
The government must not be forced by public opinion to take short-sighted 
actions, such as appeasement, to avoid such attacks. Appeasement seldom works 
in the long term and even appeasement will not prevent every possible attack. 
This does not mean the government should not act vigorously to reduce the 
threat of nuclear terrorism, but it should be proactive not reactive, and certainly 
not over-reactive. The public and especially public servants and elected officials 
deserve better education concerning the facts about weapons effects. Disaster 
planning should consider realistic and stressing scenarios but not doomsday 
scenarios. Emergency response capabilities adequate to address the threat of 
limited nuclear attack should be developed, and the nature of those capabilities 
should be communicated to the public.  
Although the models used above for surface bursts are first-order and do not 
take all possible phenomena into account, the author is confident that the effects 
for a real explosion will be much more limited than those predicted by the flat-
surface burst, and the flat-surface burst is known to be much less damaging than 
an optimum altitude airburst. Better models for nuclear effects prediction in 
urban environments may produce somewhat different estimates. Such models 
should be developed and made available to emergency planning groups. The 
models should include not only the effects on structures, but also estimates of the 
injuries and fatalities that might result. With realistic effects estimates as inputs, 
planning processes should produce better policies and response plans.  
 
Robert C. Harney is an associate professor of systems engineering at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He teaches courses in combat systems engineering (sensors, 
weapons, and system integration), weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and weapons 
effects. His research involves studies of ship survivability and counter-proliferation of 
WMD, especially unconventional WMD. Before joining NPS in 1995, Dr. Harney spent 
more than two decades as a researcher and engineering manager in the defense 
industry (Martin Marietta) and at national laboratories (MIT Lincoln Lab and 
Lawrence Livermore National Lab). He holds a B.S. in chemistry and physics from 
Harvey Mudd College and a PhD in Engineering – Applied Science from University of 
California at Davis. Dr. Harney may be reached at harney@nps.edu.  
 
The views and opinions in this paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily 




                                                
1 Graham  Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York NY:  
Henry Holt & Co., 2004). This is a widely-cited example, but even a quick search of the Internet 
reveals many others. See Bill Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares,” The New York Times Magazine, May 
26 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/magazine/nuclear-nightmares.html and Bruce 
Goldman, “Nuclear Nightmare in Manhattan,”, New Scientist, March 18, 2006. 
HARNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
19 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & Response to Radiological 
and Nuclear Threats, “Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation”, Homeland 
Security Council, January 16, 2009. 
3 Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd Ed. (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 101.  Most of the material on weapons effects can be 
found in this reference. If no reference is given for an effect, it is probably obtained from 
Glasstone and Dolan. Although long out of print, it can be found at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/effects/effects.shtml among others. 
4 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, OTA-NS-89 
(Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 19. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Sheldon Silver, “New York City Transit Needs”, Speaker of the Assembly, State of New York, 
February 2000, http://assembly.state.ny.us/Reports/200002nyctransit.pdf. 
7 Federal Transit Administration, “Long Island Rail Road East Side Access,” Department of 
Transportation, November 2005, http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/NY_New_York-
LIRR_ESA.doc.  660,000 employees working within 0.5 miles of Grand Central Terminal 
corresponds to a density of approximately 330,000 per km2 over a circle of radius 0.8km. 
8 American Hospital Association, “Fast Facts on US Hospitals”, 2008, 
http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-andStudies/fast-facts.html. 
9 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons.  
10 Ibid., 115. 
11 Office of Technology Assessment, Effects of Nuclear War, 21-22. 
12 Hiroshima International Council for Medical Care of the Radiation-exposed, A-Bomb Radiation 
Effects Digest (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993). 
13 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 430. 
14 National Research Council, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, Health 
Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR V (Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 1990). 
15 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 535. 
16 Ibid., 544. 
17 Hiroshima International Council for Medical Care of the Radiation-exposed, A-Bomb Radiation 
Effects Digest.. 
18 Office of Technology Assessment, Effects of Nuclear War, 27-31. 
19 Melanie Heron, Donna L. Hoyert, Sherry L. Murphy, Jiaquan Xu, Kenneth D. Kochanek, and 
Betzaida Tejada-Vera, National Vital Statistics Report 57, no. 14 (April 2009): 2.  In 2006 there 




Beyond the Plan: Individual Responder and Family 
Preparedness in the Resilient Organization 
Mark Landahl and Cynthia Cox 
The level of preparedness and capability of government and private sector first-
response entities to react to disaster rests upon the assumption that the human 
element, essential employees, will be ready and able to carry out the functions 
that have been planned, the tasks they have been trained to perform, provided 
the necessary equipment to complete, and that proficiency has been 
demonstrated through exercise. The assumption that first responders will report 
is the foundation of the ability of organizations to maintain continuity and 
provide essential services to citizens affected by disaster. This raises the question: 
how solid is our foundation for emergency response in disasters? Studies 
reviewed in this article show that personal and family preparedness and safety 
are the predominant issues for first responders in their ability and willingness to 
report for assignment in a crisis. This raises another question: Are we doing 
enough to allay the concerns of first responders so that they will clock in at the 
time we need them most? 
This article provides an overview of employee and family preparedness and 
role of the employer in a resilient organization. Literature related to individual 
employee and family preparedness and the ability and willingness to report in 
emergency situations is reviewed as well as the adequacy of current DHS policy in 
addressing employee preparedness issues. In addition, the results of a survey of 
homeland security leaders on the issues of employee preparedness as it relates to 
response capability and organizational resilience will be presented. The overall 
goal of the paper is to examine the role of the employer in developing and 
maintaining employee and family preparedness and to identify the general 
elements of an effective preparedness program in a resilient organization. 
As we focus on the ability and willingness of first responders to report as a 
function of organizational capability it is necessary to define these terms.  Ability 
is defined as “whether an individual would be available and have the necessary 
means to report for duty.”1 The term willingness is defined as “whether an 
individual would report for duty or respond positively to a request to report for 
duty.”2 Current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) preparedness guidance 
through the National Preparedness Guidelines and capabilities-based planning 
tools (National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities 
List) define capability simply as “the means to accomplish the mission.”3 The 
guidance also describes a capability as consisting of the following elements: 
planning, organization and leadership, personnel, equipment and systems, 
training and exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions. Clearly, the 
availability of first-response personnel to report for assignment is a core element 
of capability. 
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RESPONDER ABILITY, WILLINGNESS TO REPORT AND THE 
FAMILY CONNECTION – PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The example set in the wake of Hurricane Katrina illustrates the importance of 
employee preparedness in the ability of response organizations to carry out 
mission-essential functions. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) faced 
incredible odds in the response to the catastrophe and “lost almost all 
effectiveness.”4 There are a number of contributing factors identified in the 
various official reports that led to the collapse of NOPD; among these was the fact 
that “missing police officers led to a law enforcement manpower shortage.”5  
Although a percentage of officers were derelict in their duties, the vast majority 
either became victims themselves or were unable to report because of storm-
related personal crises. The U.S. Senate report on Hurricane Katrina estimates 
that 5 percent of the NOPD forces were stranded at home.6  The question is what 
preparedness activities taken by NOPD would have reduced the number of absent 
officers? 
This specific question has not been researched and is not the direct subject of 
this article, but informs its overall purpose. Although there is no direct research 
on this subject, there was a noticeable change in the preparation of employees by 
NOPD during the 2008 hurricane season. In preparation for Hurricane Gustav, 
which was originally projected for a Katrina-style direct hit on New Orleans, the 
NOPD gave employees paid time off to prepare and evacuate their families before 
reporting for duty.7 Thankfully for New Orleans, but unfortunately for research 
on the effectiveness of the strategy, Hurricane Gustav gave only a glancing blow 
to New Orleans. The strategy shift by NOPD itself evidences the importance of 
prepared employees and families to the overall organizational capability of 
NOPD.  
The direct evidence provided by the strategic shift of the NOPD example is 
supported by several studies related to family issues and the ability and 
willingness of first responders to report for assignment. Three studies conducted 
at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security in 
three different first-response disciplines and two different geographic regions 
yield similar results. A study of police officers in the National Capital Region 
(NCR) by Nancy Demme (2007) revealed that family preparedness and safety 
were the determinant factors in the ability and willingness of police officers to 
report for assignment in a biological incident.8 A study of the ability and 
willingness of firefighters in the NCR to respond to a pandemic influenza 
outbreak by John Delaney (2008) yielded similar results. The study found that 
the “principal variables affecting fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic 
centers around family.”9  A third study by Shelley Schechter (2007) on the ability 
and willingness of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers in Nassau County, NY to 
respond revealed that that one of the most significant barriers to the fulfillment 
of job requirements during a disaster is family responsibilities.10 
There have been other studies conducted in the first-response field, 
particularly in public health and healthcare, which reveal common concerns 
about family as an obstacle to reporting to work.  A study by Yaron Shapira and 
LANDAHL & COX, BEYOND THE PLAN 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
3 
others (1991) of the willingness of hospital personnel in Israel to report to work in 
response to an unconventional missile attack drew similar conclusions. The 
majority of respondents cited the need to care for their family as one of the 
reasons for their unwillingness to report.11  A study of healthcare workers at forty-
seven hospitals in New York City by Kristine Qureshi and others (2005) revealed 
that family issues impacted both the willingness (concern for family) and the 
ability (childcare, eldercare, and pet care) of hospital workers to report for duty.12 
A national study of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) by Charles DiMaggio 
and others (2005) revealed that “concern for family (44.3 percent) led the list of 
reasons respondents would not be willing to respond to a major bioterrorist, 
chemical, or nuclear disaster.”13 An unpublished study by Thomas Nestel (2005) 
of the ability and willingness of police officers in Philadelphia to respond using 
the fifteen National Planning Scenarios revealed that based on the given scenario 
55-66 percent of police officers reported they would refuse to adhere to an 
emergency recall or would consider abandoning their position based upon 
concerns for the safety of their family.14   
These studies indicate that family and personal preparedness issues are in the 
forefront of the minds of responders in their decision to report to work in 
emergencies. The questions revealed in seeking to understand how to counter 
this concern among first responders are: is the preparedness of individual first 
responders and their families in the forefront of the preparedness activities of 
first response organizations? Or are our efforts focused too heavily on 
preparedness of personnel to perform a tactical response mission (response 
training, equipment acquisition, and response exercises) that they may not report 
to complete? 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PREPAREDNESS 
GUIDANCE AND EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
As discussed in the opening paragraph, current DHS guidance developed under 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness 
measures preparedness in terms of the capability to prevent, protect, respond to, 
and recover from all-hazards disasters. Capability is defined by the National 
Preparedness Guidelines as “the means to accomplish the mission.”15 The 
capabilities-based planning toolbox (National Planning Scenarios, Universal 
Task List, and Target Capabilities List) defines thirty-seven core capabilities 
described in the TCL that outline the range of necessary actions to prevent, 
protect, respond to, and recover from all-hazards emergencies. The question is 
what guidance does the capabilities-based planning process provide for employee 
and family preparedness? 
Of the thirty-seven capabilities, none deal directly with the individual and 
family preparedness of responders. In the TCL each of the thirty-seven 
capabilities is defined, the expected outcome is stated, and performance tasks 
and measures/metrics for capability achievement are delineated. Although the 
individual preparedness of responders and families are not specifically grouped 
into a single capability there are several associated capabilities that contain 
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elements necessary for achieving employee and family preparedness. The three 
most closely associated capabilities are Community Preparedness and 
Participation, Responder Safety and Health, and Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, 
and Related Services). The expected outcomes for each of these capabilities are 
described below in Table 1. 
 




Community Preparedness and Participation 
There is a structure and a process for ongoing 
collaboration between government and 
nongovernmental resources at all levels; volunteers 
and nongovernmental resources are incorporated in 
plans and exercises; the public is educated and 
trained in the four mission areas of preparedness; 
citizens participate in volunteer programs and 
provide surge capacity support; nongovernmental 
resources are managed effectively in disasters; and 
there is a process to evaluate progress. 
Responder Safety and Health No illnesses or injury to any first responder, first 
receiver, medical facility staff member, or other 
skilled support personnel as a result of preventable 
exposure to secondary trauma, 
chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or 
physical and emotional stress after the initial 
incident or during decontamination and incident 
follow-up. 
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and 
Related Services) 
Mass care services, including sheltering, feeding, 
and bulk distribution, are rapidly provided for the 
population and companion animals within the 
affected area 
 
The outcome and activities described for each capability outlined in Table 1 do 
not delineate special considerations or guidance that impacts first responder 
ability and willingness to report for assignment. Several of the capabilities do, 
however, begin to address some of the underlying conditions. Are these disparate 
elements sufficient to ensure that first responders will leave their families and 
report for assignment in challenging conditions? This is a critical issue as all of 
the response capabilities outlined by the TCL rest on the assumption that 
personnel required to perform these tasks will report for assignment.  
The Community Preparedness and Participation capability is the most closely 
associated capability as it seeks a populace educated and trained in the four 
preparedness mission areas. Training is an essential element in preparedness. 
The training of the general populace, however, has fewer requirements than those 
needed for first-response personnel and their families who need more than to 
simply avoid becoming victims and maintaining basic necessities; they must be 
able to report for assignment in dire conditions. One of the planning assumptions 
in the TCL description for this capability is “professional responders and 
volunteers may get ill or fail to participate as expected due to fear of getting sick, 
or perceived greater need to care for their own families.”17 Although it is assumed 
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in the TCL that responders and volunteers may have a perceived greater need to 
care for their families, there is nothing described within this capability to counter 
or attempt to minimize the impact of family concerns on the ability and 
willingness of responders to report. This is a critical element of our overall 
preparedness, identified as a planning assumption, but any method for 
potentially mitigating the problem is absent from the guidance. 
The Responder Safety and Health capability seeks an outcome where the 
responder does not become the victim of any secondary injury or exposure. This 
outcome and associated activities, including ensuring appropriate personal 
protective equipment, monitoring post-incident health, etc., addresses some of 
the underlying concerns of responders who fear that exposure to hazardous 
and/or contagious substances at work may be spread to families. Responders 
who are properly trained, equipped and exercised under this capability may be 
more willing to report for assignment, but the capability does not address many 
of the issues tied to the ability of responders to report.   
The Mass Care Capability strives to provide shelter, food, and bulk distribution 
for populations and companion animals within an area affected by disaster. 
Although not specifically delineated among the previously identified research, it 
is a reasonable conclusion that the individual safety and access to adequate food 
and shelter for family members would be a concern of first responders. Similar to 
the Community Preparedness and Participation capability, planning assumptions 
are identified that show understanding of the concerns of first responders. The 
planning assumptions state: “As a result of the incident, many local emergency 
personnel – paid and volunteer – that normally respond to disasters may be 
dead, injured, involved with family concerns, or otherwise unable to reach their 
assigned posts.”18 Of elements outlined in the assumption about first responders, 
death, injury, family concerns or inability to reach assigned posts, only family 
concerns can be mitigated. The TCL falls short in providing guidance in 
addressing the family concerns of responders. In fairness, “family concerns” 
could be construed to include a wide variety of issues that could include anything 
from the death of a family member in the disaster to simply needing food and 
shelter for family members. The latter is more simply achieved, while the former 
is impossible to address in an effort to encourage responders to report.   
There is a clear disconnect between what responders describe as issues 
affecting their ability and willingness to report and preparedness guidance that 
does not begin to address the issue. The TCL does not adequately address the 
underlying conditions that are necessary for successful disaster response: the 
ability and willingness of employees to report for tactical assignment. Overall 
these capability outcomes describe several elements of what could be pulled 
together to define a First Responder and Family Care and Preparedness 
Capability. Can the issue of first responder and family preparedness be 
adequately addressed through modification of the critical tasks and outcomes of 
the three identified capabilities in the current guidance, or does a specific 
capability need to be developed? Are we truly prepared if we have not addressed 
the conditions that may cause our responders to fail to report or abandon posts in 
a disaster? The guidance recognizes these as planning assumptions, but what do 
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we do about them? In this case the preparedness guidance falls short of getting to 
actual preparedness.  
EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS: A SURVEY OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS 
A survey of graduates and current participants in the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) master’s degree and 
executive leaders programs was conducted to gather information and opinions 
concerning employee preparedness and its role in organizational preparedness 
and resilience The purpose of the survey was twofold. First, it provided an 
exploratory view of agencies’ efforts to prepare employees and families; e.g. the 
existence of written plans to support employees and families in disaster, and the 
content and frequency of training programs targeted at employee and family 
preparedness. With limited research in the area, gathering this information was 
an important first step. Second, the survey collected data concerning the opinions 
of homeland security leaders on the role of employers in building and sustaining 
employee and family preparedness. This was important in discerning the level of 
problem recognition among the group and its correlation to existing plans and 
training in agencies.  
The survey was conducted over the three-week period prior to the 2009 CHDS 
Annual Alumni Conference. A web link to the online survey was posted to CHDS 
discussion boards and distributed via broadcast emails to approximately 325 
former and present program participants. Participation in the survey was 
voluntary and concluded with ninety-seven respondents. This particular audience 
was chosen initially as a matter of practicality; with a limited time frame and 
resources to conduct a formal study, the Center provided access to a significant 
target audience. It also allowed the authors a quick and convenient means to 
survey senior homeland security officials, emergency management leaders, and 
responders across the spectrum of disciplines and geographic regions, as well as 
the opportunity to engage them in pre- and post-conference discussion forums on 
the topic of employee and family preparedness. CHDS program participants are 
generally not typically representative of the larger homeland security community 
individually or organizationally. Individually they have been exposed to a broader 
curriculum of study than the average homeland security professional through 
participation in the program. They also represent homeland security 
organizations that are generally more progressive, demonstrated by their 
commitment to sponsor employees through the CHDS program.   
Using an online survey tool, the questionnaire was composed of thirty-eight 
multiple choice questions in four core areas: 
• Participant and Organization Demographics   
• General Organizational Emergency Preparedness  
• The Organization and Employee and Family Emergency Preparedness 
• The Role of the Employer in Employee and Family Emergency 
Preparedness 
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Participant and Organization Demographics 
Participants in the survey represent the wide variety of disciplines in the 
homeland security community. Specifically, emergency management and 
homeland security (24.2 percent), law enforcement (22 percent), military, fire, 
public health and medical, in that order, were the largest individual groups 
represented, with a few responders from private industry, public administration, 
transportation, and education. Emergency medical services was listed as a 
specific discipline and surprisingly had few representatives (3.2 percent); 
however, the inclusion of medical and public health as a separate discipline, and 
dual-role positions such as firefighter/EMT, may account for more emergency 
medical responders participating than the survey indicates. 
The majority of survey participants hold senior management positions in their 
agencies (51.6 percent), followed by mid-management (25.3 percent), with the 
remainder filling various agency roles including supervisors, staff, responders, 
and others. The number of respondents in senior leadership positions is 
significant since these are the decision makers who are typically responsible for 
agency policy, strategic planning, and new program development. These 
individuals also control organizational resources that can be applied to solving 
recognized problems.  
The majority of organizations represented included federal (32.6 percent), 
state (24.2 percent), and local (29.5 percent) government agencies, with 5,000 or 
more employees (37.9 percent) being the most common. Most organizations are 
in communities with populations over 750,000 (76.8 percent) and 50.5 percent 
had three or more local, state, or federal disaster declarations in the past five 
years. 
General Organizational Emergency Preparedness 
Participants were asked about the general emergency preparedness training and 
education provided by their organizations. Participants reported these courses 
are provided by FEMA, state and local homeland security agencies, the 
organization itself, or others that focus on the response and actions of the 
organization and the individual as a part of a team during emergencies.  In 
addition, participants reported:     
• 65.9 percent of organizations provide general emergency preparedness 
training and education opportunities for employees. 
• 55 percent of organizations require employees to attend general 
emergency preparedness training. 
• 74.6 percent of organizations do not offer any type of incentives for 
attending general emergency preparedness training. 
• 52.5 percent of the survey participants felt that incentives would increase 
employee participation in emergency preparedness education and training 
in their organization. 
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• 43.3 percent report that general emergency preparedness training is 
offered at least annually by their organization, most often during regular 
in-service activities. 
• General preparedness training and education is presented using a variety 
methods including online courses, onsite courses, self study and in-service 
training opportunities, and various formats including web-based and/or 
face-to-face instruction, video, and print materials. 
• Coordination of general emergency preparedness training is usually an 
additional duty of a regular staff member (54.1 percent). Less than half 
(45.9 percent) reported having a dedicated full-time staff member to 
coordinate general emergency preparedness training. 
Organizations and Employee and Family Emergency Preparedness 
Participants were asked about their organizations and the existence of policies, 
plans, and education and training related to employee and family emergency 
preparedness.  Participants reported:     
• 46.8 percent of organizations have written plans or policies in place to 
support employees only (food, shelter) during large-scale disaster 
operations. 
• 29.2 percent of organizations have written plans or policies in place to 
support employee families (food, shelter) during a large-scale disaster. 
• 29.1 percent of organizations provide training and education for employee 
and family preparedness. 
• Of those that do offer family emergency preparedness training, 85.3 
percent report that participation is voluntary. 
• 70.3 percent of the organizations do not offer opportunities for employee 
or family members to attend emergency preparedness training or 
education events hosted by the organization. 
The Employer’s Role in Employee and Family Emergency 
Preparedness 
Survey participants were asked to give their opinions regarding the role of the 
employer in employee and family preparedness and the relation of employee and 
family preparedness to organization resilience during large scale emergencies. 
Ninety-seven percent of respondents agreed that employee and family 
preparedness is an essential element in organizational resilience during large-
scale emergencies. 
Participants were also asked their opinion on the role of the employer in 
employee and family preparedness based on a progressive four-option scale of 
organizational responsibility. The scale proceeded from (1) no obligation to 
employee and family preparedness, to (2) encouraging employee and family 
preparedness by providing the opportunity through education and training, (3) 
mandating training, and concluded with (4) mandating training and the inclusion 
of personal and family preparedness through performance evaluations (where 
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allowed by law and/or negotiated labor agreement). The results to this question 
are shown below as percentage of the all respondents (totaling 100 percent).  
 
(1)  1.2 percent agreed that employer has no obligation to employees and 
families in their personal preparedness. 
(2) 52.9 percent agreed the employer should encourage employee 
preparedness by providing the opportunity for education and training in 
personal and family preparedness. 
(3) 20.0 percent agreed that the employer should require employee 
preparedness by providing mandatory education and training in personal 
and family preparedness. 
(4) 25.9 percent agreed that the employer should provide mandatory 
education and training to employees, and encourage family and personal 
preparedness through inclusion in performance evaluations or incentives. 
Additionally, participants were asked to select the statement that best described 
their opinion on the role of the employer in relation to essential employees and 
their families during the response phase of a large-scale emergency based again 
on a progressive four-option scale of organizational responsibility. The scale 
proceeded from (1) no additional responsibility for the employer, to (2) employer 
responsibility ends at encouraging employee and family preparedness by 
providing the opportunity through pre-emergency education and training, (3) the 
employer should be prepared to assume some responsibility for the care of 
essential employees only, and concluded with (4) the employer should be 
prepared to assume some responsibility for the care of essential employees and 
their families.      
(1) 3.3 percent felt the employer has no additional responsibilities to essential 
employees and their families during the response phase to large-scale 
emergencies. 
(2) 22.4 percent believed employer responsibility ends at encouraging 
preparedness and providing pre-emergency training and resources for 
personal and family preparedness. 
(3) 22.4 percent felt the employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees only during large-scale 
emergency response and recovery operations to include provision of food 
and shelter. 
(4) 52.9 percent responded the employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families during 
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The survey results provide a snapshot of organizational activities and attitudes 
and opinions of homeland security leaders on the topic of employee and family 
emergency preparedness. While the survey was not designed to illustrate causal 
relationships, it provides needed baseline information about a topic where little 
exists. The key takeaway from the survey is that homeland security leaders 
generally (97 percent) recognize that employee and family preparedness is an 
essential element to organizational resilience during large-scale emergencies and 
a majority (52.9 percent) report that the organization should be prepared to 
assume some responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families.  
According to survey data there is a fundamental disconnect between problem 
recognition by homeland security leaders and organizational activities; only 29 
percent of participants reported their organizations had conducted training in or 
had written plans to support employees and families during disaster.   
The data also reveals an interesting paradox in how to address the issue. The 
majority (52.9 percent) reported that the employer responsibility ends at 
encouraging employee preparedness by providing the opportunity for education 
and training in personal and family preparedness. If, as the survey data suggests, 
employee and family preparedness is central to organizational capability and 
preparedness, can organizations afford to simply encourage?    
EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS AND THE RESILIENT 
ORGANIZATION: RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
The reviewed research indicates that individual and family preparedness and the 
ability and willingness of responders is a significant issue in the decision of 
responders to report for duty in disasters. The collected survey data shows that 
the problem is understood by leaders in the field of homeland security as 97 
percent agree that employee and family preparedness is an essential element to 
organizational resilience during large-scale emergencies and 52.9 percent of 
respondents indicated that organizations should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and their families during large-
scale response and recovery operations to include food and shelter. The problem 
is that only 29 percent of the respondents reported their organizations had 
written plans to support the families of responders. This may be attributed to the 
lack of policy guidance in current DHS preparedness policy, a focus on 
prevention and response capabilities, or a lack of organizational resources 
directed toward the problem. The problem is clear; the solutions are not as easily 
defined.   
This article will fall short of delineating a definitive set of “best practices,” as it 
is the opinion of the authors that further research is necessary. This section is 
presented in an effort to stimulate a critical discussion that will lead to the 
development of true best practices for responder and family preparedness. There 
may be significant differences in how to approach the problem based on response 
discipline, geographic region, and/or local threat profile. Although there are still 
many unknowns in fully addressing this issue, it is prudent to present 
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consolidated recommendations from reviewed studies to begin the discussion on 
the development of best practices.   
In several of the reviewed research studies the authors provide recommended 
actions for enhancements that would result in greater reporting rates for 
responders. The studies suggest actions that are broadly focused on the full 
spectrum of issues that influence responder ability and willingness to report. This 
article reviews and evaluates only recommendations pertinent to individual 
responder and family preparedness. In addition to recommendations from 
previous research, the problem was also examined and suggested courses of 
action evaluated in a focus group convened as a breakout session of the 2009 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security Alumni 
Conference. The results constitute the initial salvo in a continuing effort to define 
“best practices” for organizations to increase responder and family preparedness. 
The studies and events examined in this article propose a set of 
recommendations that, if implemented, may assist in increasing the report rate of 
first-response personnel in disasters. It is likely that there may be differences in 
application of solutions to the problem in different responder disciplines and 
geographic regions based upon the community threat profile. Further research is 
necessary in this area. As response agencies examine the results and 
recommendations of these studies they should consider conducting their own 
research of the attitudes and preparedness characteristics of their personnel. The 
recommendations will be divided into pre-incident and response-phase activities 
and examined across three levels of organizational responsibility for responder 
and family preparedness that will be explored in the following section. 
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESPONDER AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
The several studies reviewed indicate there is a potentially serious problem with 
first responders reporting for assignment in the event of disaster. There is no 
“magic bullet”; this is a multi-faceted problem that has several overlapping and 
underlying issues that, if even partially addressed, may increase responder 
reporting rates. Examining policy recommendations from the many studies can 
be combined to form the basis of a strategic approach to problem mitigation.  
There is a critical two-part policy question that agencies and/or first response 
communities (cities, counties, and states, hereafter referred to as organizations) 
need to address before engaging options for mitigation. The critical question is: 
what level of commitment does the organization want to make to involvement in 
the personal and family preparedness of its responders (1) pre-incident and (2) 
during the response? In the survey of CHDS program participants these two 
questions were posed to solicit opinions on how agencies should be involved in 
each of these based on progressive scales. These scales can also be utilized to 
delineate options for organizations in determining their expected level of 
involvement in individual responder and family preparedness. The scale for the 
pre-incident role of the employer is detailed below in table 2.  
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Table 2: Options for the Pre-incident Role of the Employer in Responder and Family 
Preparedness 




The employer has no obligation to employees 
and families in their personal preparedness. 
Low 
The employer should encourage employee 
preparedness by providing the opportunity for 
education and training in personal and family 
preparedness. 
Moderate 
The employer should require employee 
preparedness by providing mandatory education 
and training in personal and family 
preparedness. 
High 
The employer should provide mandatory 
education and training to employees, and 
encourage personal and family preparedness 
through inclusion in performance evaluations or 
incentives. (where not limited by state/local law 
or negotiated agreement) 
 
The research indicates that the option for employers to have no responsibility in 
the pre-incident preparedness of responders and their families is ill-advised. 
Selecting a low, moderate, or high level of organizational involvement in 
developing employee and family preparedness may depend on the risk-tolerance, 
resources, and/or community/organizational relationship with employees. The 
policy decision on the level of organizational involvement is critical in evaluating 
the applicability of pre-incident recommended actions that follow.    
 
Table 3: Options for the Role of the Employer in Responder and Family Preparedness 
during the Response to Disaster 




The employer has no additional responsibilities to 
essential employees and their families during the 
response phase to large-scale emergencies. 
Low 
The employer responsibility ends at encouraging 
preparedness and providing pre-emergency training and 
resources in personal and family preparedness. 
Moderate 
The employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees only 
during large-scale emergency response and recovery 
operations to include food and shelter. 
High 
The employer should be prepared to assume some 
responsibility for the care of essential employees and 
their families during large-scale response and recovery 
operations to include food and shelter. 
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The answer to the second part of the policy question concerning the level of 
organizational responsibility for employees and families during the response to 
large-scale emergencies (Table 3) is also a necessary first-step in examining 
options for implementation. A high degree of organizational responsibility in 
assuming some obligation for employees and families will require significant 
resources to undertake at a time when community resources are likely to be 
scarce. Again, based on the conclusions of the previous research it would be 
imprudent to dismiss organizational responsibility in the preparedness of 
responders and their families. Organizational resources may not allow for a high 
degree of commitment, but there are steps that can be taken to reduce the scope 
of the problem to a level of risk-tolerance appropriate for the organization.   
There is also a policy question of how to handle this problem across first 
response disciplines within a community. Should each response agency consider 
this problem in isolation? Or should this issue be handled across the response 
disciplines in a community at the municipal, county, regional, or state level? The 
governmental structure of the community, recognition of the problem by 
community and response discipline leaders, and community hazard profile may 
all contribute to determining the appropriate level and organizational 
responsibility for this issue within a community.    
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYEE AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS 
In this section recommendations for policy and plans that organizations may 
implement to potentially mitigate the problem at various levels of organizational 
responsibility for employee and family preparedness will be explored. Several of 
the reviewed studies present recommendations related to organizational policy 
and planning for responders and families in two phases of incidents: the Pre-
incident and Incident Response phases of disasters. These recommendations and 
results of discussions from the 2009 CHDS Annual Alumni Conference will be 
examined.    
The study of Medical Reserve Corps volunteers by Schechter revealed that the 
assurance that their family would be cared for was identified as the most 
important factor in enabling them to respond.19 This conclusion is echoed by 
several of the other identified studies and forms the basis for getting people to 
report during disaster. There is both a pre-incident and incident response policy 
and planning component to this problem. The pre-incident policy and planning 
component will be discussed progressing from the low to moderate to high level 
of organizational responsibility. This level is defined by creating the framework 
and opportunity for employee and family preparedness without the organization 
assuming any burden during disaster response operations.  
As we continue to examine this topic we will proceed with the assumption that 
the notional organization discussed has taken basic preparedness steps 
consistent with current DHS preparedness guidance. This includes the existence 
of an all-hazards response plan consistent with the Comprehensive Planning 
Guide and the National Incident Management System, necessary training has 
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been conducted and required equipment has been obtained to ensure responders 
have the necessary skills and equipment to perform required capabilities, 
exercises have been performed and evaluated, and corrective actions have been 
implemented. Beginning with this assumption allows for a more focused 
discussion of the issue of responder and family preparedness. While it is 
unreasonable to believe that all agencies have fully implemented all aspects of 
DHS preparedness guidance, we can reasonable assume that the process has been 
engaged at some level by most agencies. Although some general preparedness 
elements will be highlighted, the intention is to move the discussion beyond 
general preparedness to identify elements to mitigate gaps between DHS 
preparedness guidance and the anticipated actions of responders identified in the 
research. 
Pre-Incident Phase: Recommendations for Responder and Family 
Preparedness 
The primary pre-incident policy issue is fostering an environment where personal 
and family preparedness becomes a cultural element of the organization. 
Although described in the planning assumptions of the planning target capability 
outlined in the TCL, a first critical step is ensuring response plans have been 
shared with affected personnel. Demme’s study of police officers in the NCR 
revealed that many of the respondents did not have knowledge of biological 
incident response plans they were expected to be involved in implementing.20 
This is a basic first policy step in developing the transparency that is necessary 
for responders at the lowest level to develop an understanding of the range of 
duties they will be tasked with in disaster situations. If emergency or alternative 
staffing plans have been developed, these must also be shared with responders. If 
we are asking responders to be prepared at home, they need to understand the 
full scope of their expected duties to determine the potential impact on their 
families. In addition to the study by Demme, this recommendation is also made 
by other studies including the 2005 study of healthcare workers by Qureshi and 
others.   
Once transparency is established through sharing plans, responders need to 
have the tools to successfully build their personal and family preparedness. This 
is developed through training. Most of the DHS-sponsored training is focused on 
management-level planning and tactical response knowledge, skills, and abilities 
for which local expertise does not exist in most communities. There is a gap in 
responder and family preparedness training that is not a DHS issue, but needs to 
be a locally developed and locally focused. The content should be driven by the 
organizational decision regarding the level of involvement in responder and 
family preparedness. Responders may not necessarily know to ask the question 
concerning the relationship between the organization and their families pre-
incident, as they are focused on the day-to-day issues of their positions; the 
organization has to recognize the findings of the research and relay to personnel, 
before the disaster, the expectations and anticipated relationship with responders 
and their families. This can be accomplished through delivering personal and 
family preparedness training tailored to the expectation of the organization. 
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DHS/FEMA through its independent study program the DHS Ready campaign 
and the American Red Cross through its personal and family preparedness 
materials, provide a baseline that can be adopted and modified to meet local 
needs.  
Communicating the organizational expectation, then providing the tools for 
responders and families to prepare is the next critical step. For organizations/ 
response disciplines that have annual training requirements, the greatest benefit 
to the organization can be realized at minimal cost provided that personal and 
family preparedness training is incorporated into mandated training 
requirements. Training is necessary to both “prepare practically and 
psychologically” for the response.21 The importance of training is supported by a 
study of preparedness training for public health nurses that found a 12 percent 
increase in their intentions to report for assignment after attending training.22  
At the moderate to high level of organization responsibility the involvement of 
families in organization preparedness efforts should also be considered. Both 
Demme and Delaney recommend engaging responder families early in the 
preparedness process. Delaney states “Involving families early in planning a 
response, educating the entire family, and encouraging families to develop a 
sheltering plan and stockpile supplies…will help to alleviate fire fighters’ 
concerns for their families’ wellbeing.”23 Engaging families in an honest 
conversation about expectations of responders and the relationship between the 
organization and families in disaster response operations is important to 
extending transparency. Involving families early in the process, sharing plans as 
appropriate, and extending preparedness training to families of responders are 
necessary steps toward problem mitigation.   
Another critical pre-incident policy issue – at all levels of organizational 
responsibility – is ensuring responders are equipped with appropriate Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE). Many of the studies examined identify responder 
willingness to report is impacted by fears of their own personal safety and that of 
their family. Although we have previously identified an assumption about agency 
engagement of the capabilities-based planning process and introduced the 
Responder Safety and Health target capability, this issue of PPE is critically 
important; it has appeared as a finding and/or recommendation in several of the 
identified studies (Demme, Shapira, and Qureshi and others). Responders issued 
and comfortable with the use of PPE may be less apprehensive about their safety 
and the safety of their families, particularly in the response to biological-related 
incidents when the potential exists to transmit illness from responders to family 
members.   
Another recent study of hospital personnel in an avian influenza pandemic 
(not previously referenced) supports this conclusion. The study highlighted the 
“importance of providing adequate protection for the workforce may be very 
helpful in minimizing absenteeism.”24 The study of Israeli hospital workers by 
Shapira and others also supports this recommendation; 86 percent of 
respondents advised they would report for assignment if adequate safety 
measures were in place.25 Properly equipping responders for likely hazards is an 
essential step in reducing fears of the transmission of illness to family members. 
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The pre-incident organizational commitment at the low level of responsibility 
for responder and family preparedness ends at this point. The expectation has 
been communicated and the opportunity for training has been provided, but not 
mandated. The moderate level of organizational responsibility mandates 
responder and family preparedness training and utilizes other strategies to 
institutionalize pre-incident responder and family preparedness. These steps can 
include backing training with a focus on preparedness reinforced by managers 
and supervisors at the unit level. Unit-level preparedness can be developed and 
maintained through periodic review of emergency plans at staff meetings or roll-
call trainings that supervisors can then link to the family preparedness of their 
staff.   
The high level of organization responsibility extends pre-incident 
responsibility to include individual and family preparedness in employee 
performance evaluations. This recommendation was advanced by Qureshi and 
others in suggesting that the “presence of a workplace personal emergency plan 
should be noted on annual performance appraisals.”26 Performance appraisals 
communicate and reinforce agency policy and expectations of employees. A 
cultural shift to an emphasis on personal and family preparedness would be 
communicated and reinforced by utilizing the performance appraisal system.  
In this section recommended activities at the three levels of organizational 
responsibility for responder and family preparedness were examined. These 
include policy, equipment, training, and communications recommendations that 
require varying levels of organizational resources to implement. The 
recommendations form the basis of pre-incident activities that are necessary for 
success in the incident response phase.   
Response Phase: Recommendations for Responder and Family 
Preparedness 
In the response phase responder and family preparedness is an element of only 
the moderate and high levels of organizational responsibility. As we discuss 
recommendations for the response phase, elements will be examined that require 
planning and policy in the pre-incident phase. The flow of information between 
the phases makes it more appropriate to discuss these items as related to the 
response phase, although there will be many activities required in the pre-
incident phase to successfully implement the recommendations.      
The moderate level of organizational responsibility in the response phase is 
characterized by assuming some responsibility for the care of essential employees 
during disaster. At this level the organizational commitment for care does not 
broaden beyond the individual responder. The organizational responsibility for 
responders extends to providing basic food and shelter for responders, ensuring 
their ability to report and remain at work with proper rest and nutrition during a 
disaster. Achieving this goal requires pre-incident planning and additional 
resources during the response. In response operations under the Incident 
Command System (ICS) logistical support for responders including “food and 
hydration service, sleeping, sanitation and showers” are considered in on-site 
incident management.27 Local plans must determine and communicate to 
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responders the extent of logistical support during responder off-duty hours in 
local emergency situations. Responders must know if they are expected to return 
home following a shift or have the option to remain at work and be fed and 
sheltered until the next shift. Depending on the nature of the emergency, such as 
in the response to Hurricane Katrina, responders may have nowhere else to go. 
Demme outlined the need for shelter options in the response to biological agents, 
as responders may be “willing to report to work, but are not willing to return 
home after a tour of duty, out of fear of contaminating their family.”28 The 
organization needs to determine the extent of the support they will provide to 
responders, ensure that plans are developed that include necessary resources, 
and communicate those plans to responders and their families.     
The high level of organizational responsibility is characterized by the 
assumption by organizations of some responsibility for the care of essential 
employees and their families during large-scale response and recovery operations 
to include food and shelter. This statement is qualified by the term “some 
responsibility.” The statement will be interpreted to cover a range of 
recommendations that all demonstrate a high level of organizational 
responsibility, some requiring a larger commitment of organizational resources 
to accomplish. The recommendations will be examined starting with the least 
intensive options and move to options that require more resources.     
The studies by Delaney, Demme, Qureshi and others (2005), and Shechter 
each present several recommendations that vary with regards to the level of 
commitment of organizational resources. Delaney and Qureshi and others 
present similar network-based recommendations that vary only slightly and draw 
on resources in differing levels. Delaney recommends the development of 
department-level support networks that are “station-based and are led by the 
spouse of one of the members assigned to that station.”29 The goal would be to 
“develop a support network for all of the families assigned to that station or shift, 
so that in an emergency there is an established group that can assist or be called 
upon at anytime.”30 In this recommendation the need for family care is 
recognized, but the burden is shifted to a network of employees and families to 
provide assistance to one another. The organization is limited to supporting a 
position in each station, perhaps by stipend.  
Qureshi and others recommended “facilitating the formation of emergency 
childcare/eldercare pools, with staff scheduled in such a way that sharing these 
responsibilities are possible”31 The recommendations of Delaney and Qureshi and 
others represent the low end of organizational responsibility for responder and 
family preparedness in the response phase. In these recommendations the 
organization serves as a facilitator in the response phase to enable responders to 
care for one another with limited impact on the organizational resources.    
Action recommended by Demme and Schechter represent the next step in 
organization responsibility (moderate level) for responder and family 
preparedness that requires more resources. Demme recommends the 
development of a Family Support Unit (FSU) that would be “staffed with officers 
who no longer have a work assignment as a result of the bio-incident, such as, 
school resource officers, crossing guards, and court officers.”32 The FSU would 
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function to push needed support out to families, so that officers would remain at 
work and the families of those who choose to remain away for fear of spreading 
illness would have a mechanism for their families to be supported at home. 
Demme states that to “ensure that officers would remain at work, the government 
would have to demonstrate that the families would be taken care of (i.e., food, 
medical needs, etc).”33 The FSU puts more burden upon the organization than the 
model proposed by Delaney. The FSU would have to be supported by broad 
logistical capabilities to ensure access to the range of necessary commodities. The 
larger organizational commitment required for the FSU also likely ensures 
greater reliability and potential success.  
Schechter also recommended, but did not describe in detail, a support service 
program for the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) that includes “planning for 
sheltering, ‘at-home’ support for dependents and pets and a plan for provision of 
protective measures for the families of volunteers.”34 The primary goal of the 
program is to ensure “that caring for the responder’s resource needs is the first 
priority of the organization and primary to the ability of the MRC member to 
perform any other community work.”35 Qureshi and others also provided 
recommendations at the moderate level of organizational responsibility in the 
healthcare facility making arrangements with “local veterinarians or animal 
shelters for emergency pet care”36   
The issue of companion animal care was raised in several studies and has been 
a broadly recognized issue in sheltering populations in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina. In a 2006 study of hospital disaster staffing by David Cone and Bethany 
Cummings pet care ranked higher (33 percent) in “support needs that would 
enable respondents to stay at the hospital for prolonged periods if met” than both 
child care (30 percent) and adult/elder care (6 percent).37 This illustrates the 
importance of the demographic of the responders expected to be served by family 
programs. There could be a number of factors including the age, marital status, 
presence of child/elder care responsibilities, and geographic dispersion of 
employee residences that are critical for the organization to understand in 
designing programs. The recommendations of Demme, Schechter, and Qureshi 
and others represent the middle-ground of organizational responsibility for 
responder and family preparedness in the response phase.   
One recommendation proposed by Qureshi and others has already been 
examined (emergency child/elder care pools); however, their study provided two 
options. The second option presented in the study was “pre-planning for the 
formation of emergency childcare or eldercare centers that are either on or off-
site.”38 Although the study identified the first option as preferable, the second 
option provides an avenue to discuss the highest level of organizational 
responsibility during the response phase. The previous moderate options seek to 
push resources out to families, while this option pulls family members in and 
makes the organization fully responsible for their care.  
It would be reasonable to think that the likelihood of responders to report may 
increase if family members would be cared for and safe during their shift. The 
support for this strategy comes from the study of Philadelphia Police Officers by 
Nestel that indicated based on the fifteen scenarios between 72 and 81 percent of 
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officers indicated that shelters established for police officers families would 
encourage them to participate in the response.39 The study by Demme also found 
that officers “suggested that if there was some place they could drop their spouses 
and kids off where they would be safe, then they could freely go to work.”40 The 
establishment of shelters for the families of responders is both resource-intensive 
and potentially politically divisive. If shelters are established for the families of 
responders in an environment of scarce resources there could be political 
ramifications for providing care to the families of responders that may not be 
available to the general public. The issue is in need of further focused research. 
In this section recommended activities at the high level of organizational 
responsibility for responder and family preparedness were examined. The 
recommendations cover a range of activities from creating a framework for family 
support with the dedication of limited organizational resources to the complete 
care provided by the organization that requires the commitment of significant 
resources. There is obviously no ‘magic bullet’ to this problem and the only sure 
element is that continuing broad discussion of options and political issues must 
take place.   
SUMMARY 
The issue of responder and family preparedness is “just below the radar” in our 
national preparedness efforts. In reviewing several studies and determining the 
ability and willingness of responders to report for assignment in disaster a 
consistent theme emerges: families matter. The results point to a disconnect 
between the focus of national preparedness policy and the thoughts of responders 
when making the decision to report to work. The decision is not entirely based on 
having operational training, equipment to perform the tactical mission, and 
exercises to demonstrate proficiency, but also involves what is going to happen to 
family when responders walk out the door, or come back in after dealing with a 
disaster. The problem is multi-faceted and in need of further study and analysis. 
The issue has not been the direct subject of research, but appears as a consistent 
factor across response disciplines and geographic areas.   
In this article the issue was examined to include an analysis of options for 
mitigation presented in disparate studies. The options were examined as pre-
incident and incident-response phase activities that required varying levels of 
organizational responsibility for responder and family preparedness and care. 
The level of organizational responsibility ranged from the employer simply 
providing the opportunity for responders to prepare themselves through policy 
and training at the low level to a high-level organizational commitment requiring 
significant resources to push needed items to responder families or pull families 
in to organization-established shelters.  
As response organizations examine the results and recommendations of these 
studies they should consider conducting their own research of the attitudes and 
preparedness characteristics of their personnel. The key is organizational 
understanding of its employees, their demographics, and geographic dispersion. 
It is recommended that organizations undertake evidence-based studies before 
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considering the commitment of substantial resources to the preparedness of 
responders and potential care of their families during the response phase. There 
may be extreme differences in responder populations based on regional 
characteristics, response disciplines, and/or employee demographics that may 
radically shift recommended actions within a locality.          
In reviewing the research and DHS preparedness guidance it is obvious that 
the issue has not reached the stage of broad recognition. The role of the 
individual employee and family preparedness in overall organization 
preparedness and resilience may be the “soft underbelly” of post-9/11 
preparedness and response efforts. Perhaps, as was recognized by NOPD 
following Hurricane Katrina, we need a national strategic shift in our 
preparedness efforts to focus on the underlying conditions that impact the 
decision of first responders to report for assignment. 
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Do Terrorists "Win" Elections? 
John A. Tures 
A bomb blast in Spain, just before the country's election, destroyed several 
commuter trains, killing hundreds and wounding thousands. Three days later, 
Spanish voters turned out the conservative Popular Party and Prime Minister 
Jose Maria Aznar, inserting the Spanish Socialist Party leader Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero as Aznar's replacement. 
Several months later, a cryptic message was delivered to the offices of al-
Jazeera in Pakistan. Within hours, American audiences were watching Osama bin 
Laden's videotape. An initial poll from Newsweek magazine claimed that 
incumbent President George W. Bush jumped to a six-point lead as a result of the 
reaction to al-Qaeda's message. A few days later, President Bush and the 
Republicans prevailed over the challenger, Senator John F. Kerry from 
Massachusetts. 
In both these cases, the media claimed that terrorists determined the outcome 
of the elections, an opinion that is commonly held.1 If this opinion is true, it 
implies that terrorists have power over the fundamental workings of democracy. 
But is the opinion true? Did the terrorists in fact win at the ballot box in 2004? 
To answer this question, I analyzed survey results from before and after the votes 
were cast, as well as relevant material from the literature and results from focus 
groups. The analysis shows that the terrorists did little, if anything, to change the 
outcome of either election.   
THE COMMUTER TRAIN BOMBINGS IN SPAIN 
On March, 11, 2004, roughly 200 people were killed and 1,500 were wounded in 
bomb attacks on Spanish commuter trains. The attack took place just three days 
before the election.2 This case is often used by the media as a textbook example of 
how terrorists influence elections.3 The incumbent party, the conservative 
Popular Party, was defeated at the polls.4 Given this center-right coalition's 
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, knocking Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar 
from power and the subsequent Spanish withdrawal from Iraqi was counted as an 
al-Qaeda victory.5 
Such a simple cause-and-effect analysis is questionable. A post-electoral 
survey of Spaniards by El País revealed that 70 percent of the people did not feel 
the 3/11 attacks influenced their vote choice.6 In the same survey, 86 percent of 
respondents felt that the terror attacks had influenced the rest of the electorate. 
Clearly the commuter train bombings did not sway the average Spanish voter. 
Nevertheless, voters themselves felt it influenced "somebody else," feeding into 
the myth that terrorists altered the outcome at the ballot box, despite the absence 
of evidence in this case. Moreover, the terror strikes did not create anti-Iraq war 
feelings in Spain; those attitudes were present long before the train bombings. 
"Had this vote been held a year ago, the outcome would have been similar – polls 
TURES, DO TERRORISTS WIN ELECTIONS? 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
2 
last March found that as much as 90 percent of Spanish voters opposed their 
government’s support for the war in Iraq."7 
If there was a reaction among voters to the bombings on 3/11, it appears to 
have been a reaction to the government's attempt to pin the blame for the attack 
on ETA, a Basque separatist group, “despite evidence pointing to radical 
Islamists, ETA denials, and al-Qaeda claims of responsibility.”8 Since an ETA 
attack “would likely have swelled support for the ruling party and its hard line on 
the separatists,"9 the government’s claim of ETA responsibility looked like a 
cynical attempt to take advantage of the attacks.   
Furthermore, claiming the attack was a victory for terrorists assumes we know 
what the terrorists intended the attack to accomplish. Was the goal of the attack 
to make Spain withdraw from Iraq, knock Spain from the war on terrorism, or 
reestablish the Islamic foothold in Europe from pre-1492?10 Attacks continued 
after the new prime minister promised to withdraw from Iraq,11 implying that the 
terrorists had interests other than the election. If they intended the attack to get 
Spain out of the war on terrorism, then the attack failed since Zapatero promised 
to continue to wage the war on terrorism. 
Such evidence lead Ingrid Van Biezen to conclude that "to interpret the 
election result as a victory for terrorism, as some observers could not resist, and 
to insinuate that voters who supported the Socialists somehow showed a 
reluctance decisively to reject terrorism, would be grossly unfair."12   
THE CASE OF THE OSAMA BIN LADEN VIDEOTAPE 
In America, the claim that Osama bin Laden’s video affected the outcome of the 
2004 election is part of a larger media obsession with the concept of an "October 
Surprise," or an event occurring in the waning moments of the election which 
could help one side prevail.13 The term became part of the media lexicon during 
the 1980 election, when accusations were made that Republicans attempted to 
keep the American hostages in Iran a little longer in order to bring down the 
Carter Administration. Since then, several events have been deemed "October 
Surprises."  
Despite the media fascination with October Surprises, the evidence for such 
events is thin. Though several books and op-ed articles have been written about 
the 1980 case (including one by Carter's national security aide Gary Sick), a 
bipartisan panel of members from the House of Representatives found no 
evidence for such an event, even after hundreds of interviews.14 The panel, led by 
Indiana Democrat Lee Hamilton and Illinois Republican Henry Hyde, wrote, 
"there is no credible evidence supporting any attempt or proposal to attempt by 
the Reagan Presidential campaign, or persons representing or associated with the 
campaign to delay the release of the American hostages in Iran."15 Other October 
Surprises include the decision of Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence E. 
Walsh to indict former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger for lying during the 
investigation for his role in the transfer of U.S. arms to Iran four days before the 
1992 election.16 Yet a closer analysis of the poll numbers shows that the 
indictment had little impact upon the 1992 election. Voters did not list it as 
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important. Furthermore, there is evidence that the independent counsel did not 
try to target President George H. W. Bush with the probe and even scheduled 
questioning so as not to embarrass the incumbent.17  
Despite scant supporting evidence for October surprises, when Osama bin 
Laden released a video shortly before the 2004 election in the U.S., the press 
pounced on the pre-recorded message as yet another October Surprise. The bin 
Laden videotape was delivered to the Pakistani offices of Al-Jazeera on Friday, 
October 29, 2004, according to bureau chief Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan. He claimed 
he transmitted the tape to the headquarters in Qatar.18 Al-Jazeera broadcast an 
eighteen-minute segment of the tape where Osama bin Laden addressed the 
American public, took credit for the 9/11 attacks, and issued the famous line 
about America's security not being in the hands of Bush or Kerry.19  
Following the broadcast of the bin Laden tape, a Newsweek poll found 
President Bush had an expanded lead over Kerry. Pundits saw bin Laden’s 
influence in this result.20 Philip Sherwell, for example, claimed "President Bush 
has opened a six point lead over John Kerry in the first opinion poll to include 
sampling taken after the new Osama bin Laden videotape was broadcast on 
Friday night." He added, "the Newsweek poll published yesterday, only three 
days before the presidential election, put Mr. Bush on 50 percent and Mr Kerry 
on 44 percent. A similar poll conducted a week earlier gave the president 48 
percent to his Democratic challenger's 46 percent." Sherwell commented that 
"Mr. Bush may have his greatest enemy to thank for helping him secure another 
four years in the White House after the appearance of the video sparked a sharp 
final round of argument over which candidate can best defeat terrorism." He 
continued, "The poll's findings appear to indicate that the president is benefiting 
during the last days of a bitter campaign from the focus on national security and 
the 'war on terror.’”21  
Once President Bush was reelected, the Newsweek poll was cited by news 
organizations in their post-election analysis. "In that close campaign, it was this 
video – not the Swift Boat tactics that got all the ink – that made the difference. 
John Kerry, who led in several polls that weekend, saw his margin melt away," 
Newsweek's Jonathan Alter wrote.22 The group Media Matters also mentioned 
the Newsweek poll, claiming that bin Laden provided the tape to help Bush.23 
The Huffington Post's Scott Payne claimed that the bin Laden videotape "hurt 
Kerry."24 Additionally, Senator John Kerry claimed that the videotape cost him 
the election.25  
There are several problems with such claims however. First, in reaching their 
judgment that bin Laden changed the outcome of the 2004 election, 
commentators focused only upon the pair of Newsweek polls. A different picture 
emerges if we look at other polling. Second, while there was no evidence that the 
Newsweek poll was flawed in itself, its application to the Osama bin Laden 
videotape was. After all, this Newsweek poll was taken between October 27 and 
29. The videotape was only made available on the last day of the poll and late in 
the day at that. The ability of this poll to assess the mood of the public on the 
subject of the notorious videotape is clearly questionable and does not offer much 
support for the claim that bin Laden changed the election.   
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Neither does other polling. This is evident if we look at polling both before and 
after the broadcast of the bin Laden tape (see Table 1). In thirteen polls taken 
from October 14 to just before October 22, the average lead for President Bush 
was 3.1 points. In four of these polls, the incumbent had support of 50 percent or 
more. In seven polls taken between October 21 and October 29, President Bush's 
average lead was 3.8 percent. In six polls taken after the evening of October 29, 
when the bin Laden videotape appeared, the average lead for President Bush had 
shrunk to 1.02 points. One of these polls, the Harris poll from November 2, found 
the race to be "virtually tied" and reported that Kerry had been making gains over 
the course of the past few days. The final margin of victory for the incumbent was 
roughly 1.4 percent. Of course, we are only talking about very small percentages, 
many within the margin of error, but comparing “before” and “after” polling 
suggests that if the videotape did anything, it hurt Bush and helped Kerry. 
Other polling data also suggests that the bin Laden videotape did not give 
Bush the election. For example, of those queried for an NBC/Wall Street 
Journal(WSJ) poll taken after the videotape was released, 24 percent said the 
videotape made them more inclined to support President Bush. Another 12 
percent said the videotape made them more likely to support Senator Kerry, 
while the remaining 62 percent claimed it had no effect on their vote. On the one 
hand, twice as many respondents said the videotape made them more supportive 
of President Bush. On the other hand, nearly two-thirds of those surveyed 
claimed such a factor did not matter to them. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of a general "bounce" from the NBC/WSJ poll on overall candidate 
preferences. The pre-videotape poll showed Bush and Kerry tied at 48% (in 
general preferences). After the tape was released, Bush only improved his 
standing by one percentage point.26 A possible interpretation of these numbers is 
that the videotape did not determine preferences so much as reinforce existing 
ones. 
Other polls indicated little or no change on the terrorism issue, despite the 
presence of the bin Laden videotape. In a November 1, 2008 GW/Battleground 
poll, President Bush sported a 56 percent to 37 percent lead over Kerry on the 
issue of who was better at "safeguarding America from a terrorist threat."27 When 
asked about this issue before the videotape, the results also showed Bush ahead 
at 56 percent to 36 percent. These polls suggest that the terrorism issue barely 
changed over the course of the fall campaign.28 
According to a CBS/NY Times poll taken after the broadcast of the tape, the 
number fearing an attack doubled from the poll taken before the tape. Yet there 
was no indication in this poll about which candidate benefited from the fear that 
an attack was more imminent.29 However, a CNN 2004 election exit poll 
(displayed in Table 2) shows that Senator Kerry won a small majority of those 
who claimed to be "very worried" about a terrorist attack, while losing among 
those who claimed they were only partially worried, or unconcerned about 
terrorism. In the same poll, of those who felt that the bin Laden videotape was 
"very important" (almost one-third), 53 percent voted for Senator Kerry, while 
the remaining 47 percent chose President Bush, as seen in Table 3. Bush did 
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better among those who felt the tape of the al-Qaeda leader was either "somewhat 
important," "not too important," or "not at all important."30 
Bush did win a strong majority of those who claimed terrorism was the 
number one issue (see Table 4), although his support on the issue was fairly 
robust even before the videotape appeared. But those who said the bin Laden 
videotape mattered chose Kerry by a slight margin. For those most concerned 
about the bin Laden broadcast or an imminent terrorist attack, Senator Kerry 
received the most support. He also won a majority of those who made up their 
minds in the waning days of the campaign, after the videotape had been released 
(see Table 5). It seems likely that the ones who felt confident that Bush had 
adequately protected them were not intimidated by the video and voted 
Republican in 2004.   
In any event, it seems clear that the videotape did not "scare" Americans into 
voting for President Bush as the media has implied.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite the absence of evidence that al-Qaeda successfully manipulated an 
election in Spain and the United States, the media was on full-alert for a new 
attack or bin Laden message before the 2006 and 2008 elections. Mark 
Hosenball of Newsweek claimed "a message before Election Day wouldn't be 
surprising."31 In October of 2008, Steve Kornacki wrote "it's probably time to 
start thinking about an October Surprise," citing the possibility of another Osama 
bin Laden video.32 Eli Lake, reminding readers of the videotape of 2004 and the 
Madrid train bombings, reported, "In later messages, al-Qaeda's leader claimed 
credit for helping elect Mr. Bush in 2004."33 Jonathan Alter proclaimed 
“something is going to happen. My money is on Osama bin Laden popping back 
up with a hate video, just as he did the weekend before the 2004 election."34 
Justin Raimondo of the website antiwar.com wrote, "Who would really be all that 
surprised by an October Surprise?"35 Yet the real surprise was that nothing 
happened before either election. 
There are two possible explanations for the lack of an attack. Perhaps an attack 
was planned, but not carried out due to improved security measures. Another 
possibility is that terrorists were unable to see any major changes in the proposed 
policies of leaders from the major political parties after the Madrid bombing or 
the bin Laden videotape. Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero may have pulled 
troops from Iraq, but he remained committed to the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. President Obama has adopted a similar strategy, effecting a draw-
down in Iraq while bolstering the effort in Afghanistan. In other words, terrorists 
do not appear to be gaining any special advantage for attacking or threatening 
attack prior to elections. 
The only effect that al-Qaeda seems to produce with pre-election activities is 
the media’s fascination with the terrorists’ supposed ability to "control foreign 
elections." As Tony Karon, Raj Chari, Ingrid Van Biezen, and this article have 
shown,36 at least in the cases of Spain and the United States in 2004 the terrorists 
have not yet demonstrated this ability.   
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Table 1: Polls Before and After the Osama bin Laden Videotape 
RCP Average  FINAL 50.0% 48.5% 1.0% Bush +1.5 
RCP Average 10/27 - 11/1 48.9% 47.4% 0.9% Bush +1.5 
Marist (1026 LV) 11/1 49% 50% 0% Kerry +1 
GW/Battleground (1000 LV) 10/31 - 11/1 50% 46% 0% Bush +4 
TIPP (1041 LV) 10/30 - 11/1 50.1% 48.0% 1.1% Bush +2.1 
CBS News (939 LV) 10/29 - 11/1 49% 47% 1% Bush +2 
Harris (1509 LV) 10/29 - 11/1 49% 48% 2% Bush +1 
FOX News (1200 LV) 10/30 - 10/31 46% 48% 1% Kerry +2 
Reuters/Zogby (1208 LV) 10/29 - 10/31 48% 47% 1% Bush +1 
CNN/USA/Gallup(1573 LV)* 10/29 - 10/31 49% 49% 1% TIE 
NBC/WSJ (1014 LV) 10/29 - 10/31 48% 47% 1% Bush +1 
ABC/Wash Post (2904 LV)** 10/28 - 10/31 49% 48% 0% Bush +1 
ARG (1258 LV) 10/28 - 10/30 48% 48% 1% TIE 
CBS/NY Times (643 LV) 10/28 - 10/30 49% 46% 1% Bush +3 
Pew Research (1925 LV) 10/27 - 10/30 51% 48% 1% Bush +3 
Newsweek (882 LV) 10/27 - 10/29 50% 44% 1% Bush +6 
GW/Battleground (1000 LV) 10/25 - 10/28 51% 46% 0% Bush +5 
ICR (741 LV) 10/22 - 10/26 48% 45% 2% Bush +3 
CNN/USAT/Gallup (1195 LV) 10/22 - 10/24 51% 46% 1% Bush +5 
Los Angeles Times (881 LV) 10/21 - 10/24 48% 48% 1% TIE 
Newsweek (880 LV) 10/21 - 10/22 48% 46% 1% Bush +2 
Time (803 LV) 10/19 - 10/21 51% 46% 2% Bush +5 
GW/Battleground (1000 LV) 10/18 - 10/21 49% 45% 1% Bush +4 
AP-Ipsos (976 LV) 10/18 - 10/20 46% 49% 2% Kerry +3 
Marist (772 LV w/leaners) 10/17 - 10/19 49% 48% 1% Bush +1 
FOX News (1000 LV) 10/17 - 10/18 49% 42% 2% Bush +7 
Pew Research (1070 LV) 10/15 - 10/19 47% 47% 1% TIE 
ABC/Wash Post* (1237 LV) 10/16 - 10/18 51% 46% 1% Bush +5 
NBC/WSJ (LV w/leaners) 10/16 - 10/18 48% 48% 1% TIE 
Harris (820 LV)*** 10/14 - 10/17 49.5% 44.5% 1% Bush +5 
CBS/NY Times (678 LV) 10/14 - 10/17 47% 45% 2% Bush +2 
CNN/USAT/Gallup (788 LV) 10/14 - 10/16 52% 44% 1% Bush +8 
Time (865 LV w/leaners) 10/14 - 10/15 48% 47% 3% Bush +1 
Newsweek (880 LV) 10/14 - 10/15 50% 44% 1% Bush +6 
Source: RealClearPolitics,http://www.realclearpolitics.com/bush_vs_kerry.html 
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Table 2: Worried About Terrorism 
 
TOTAL BUSH KERRY NADER 
Very Worried (22%) 44% 56% 0% 
Somewhat Worried (53%) 56% 43% 0% 
Not Too Worried (19%) 51% 47% 1% 
Not At All Worried (5%) 50% 48% 1% 
 





Table 3: Osama Bin Laden Videotape 
 
TOTAL BUSH KERRY NADER 
Very Important (32%) 47% 53% 0% 
Somewhat Important (24%) 54% 45% 0% 
Not Too Important (20%) 57% 41% 1% 
Not At All Important (24%) 55% 44% 0% 
 






Table 4: Most Important Election Issue 
 
TOTAL BUSH KERRY NADER 
Moral Values (22%) 80% 18% 1% 
Economy/Jobs (20%) 18% 80% 0% 
Terrorism (19%) 86% 14% 0% 
Iraq (15%) 26% 73% 0% 
Health Care (8%) 23% 77% * 
Taxes (5%) 57% 43% 0% 
Education (4%) 26% 73% * 
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Table 5: The Timing of Deciding Who to Vote For 
TOTAL BUSH KERRY NADER 
When Did You Decide Who To Vote For? 
Within The Last Week (11%) 46% 52% 1% 
Earlier Than That (89%) 52% 47% 0% 
TOTAL BUSH KERRY NADER 
When Did You Decide Who To Vote For? 
Today/Last 3 Days (9%) 44% 53% 1% 
Earlier Than That (91%) 52% 47% 0% 
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